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COMMENTS
THE WIDOW'S ELECTION - A STUDY
IN THREE PARTS
Cecil A. Ray, Jr.
Under the Texas community property system, each spouse has a
vested interest in one half of the community property.! The husband,
however, is given the exclusive power to manage and control the
entire community estate, even to the extent of making inter vivos
transfers, provided such transfers are not in fraud of the wife's
rights.! Nevertheless, the husband's right of testamentary disposi-
tion extends only to his one-half interest in the community estate,
i.e., he has no absolute right of testamentary disposition over the
community estate.3 Upon the husband's death, the wife is vested
with full management and control over her former community
interest.4 Whenever the will of a deceased spouse purports to dispose
of more than one half of the community estate, or other property
rights of the surviving spouse, but makes some provision for the
surviving spouse from the deceased's own property, equity permits
such a disposition under an election doctrine. The surviving spouse
may (1) assent to the disposition by waiving any statutory rights
that may be claimed, or (2) assert rights in the community property,
thereby waiving any gift under the will.' Apparently, the "widow's
1Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
'Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960).
'Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 731, 743 (1858).
'See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960); Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959); Smitheal v.
Smith, 31 S.W. 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
'1 de Funiak, Community Property S 217 (1943). See generally Comment, 6 Baylor
L. Rev. 84 (1953). In the early case of Philleo v. Holliday, 24 Tex. 38, 44 (1859), the
Texas Supreme Court defined the doctrine as follows:
The principle of election is, that he who accepts a benefit under a will,
must adopt the whole contents of the instrument, so far as it concerns him;
conforming to its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with
it. .. .
The Supreme Court of Texas in Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 312, 83 S.W.2d 620,
624 (1935), expressed the election principle in an oft-quoted statement:
Election is the obligation imposed upon a party to choose between two in-
consistent rights . . . where there is a clear intention of the person from
whom he derives one that he should not enjoy both, the principle being
that one shall not take any beneficial interest under a will, and at the same
time set up any right or claim of his own, even if legal and well founded,
which would defeat or in any way prevent the full effect and operation of
every part of the will . . . . The doctrine of election is generally regarded
as being founded on the intention of the testator.
Since the determination of whether the husband's will disposes of the wife's property
is a question of law and not a question of fact, Hodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 277
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election" doctrine is borrowed from the common law, which gives
the widow a similar election when her dower rights are inconsistent
with the deceased husband's will.'
The widow's election will may be a useful device in planning an
estate when the entire estate or a substantial portion thereof consists
of community property. In the usual widow's election will, the
husband, who normally predeceases the wife, devises the residence
to his wife in fee and places the residue of the estate, including the
wife's community interest, in a testamentary trust which provides a
life income to the wife and a distribution of corpus to the children
upon the wife's death.' Ordinarily, the wife elects to take the life
estate in the entire community, in lieu of her share of the community
estate in fee.' The husband may also make a testamentary disposi-
tion of his separate property to a trust for the wife's benefit, con-
ditioned upon the transfer of her separate property to the trust. The
two transactions create similar problems and tax consequences.'
To insure the wife's election under the will at her husband's
death, the "inter vivos election" was designed in several community
property jurisdictions. The inter vivos election is a transaction
whereby the wife executes an agreement electing to take under the
provisions of the will and waiving her community property rights
which are inconsistent with the provisions of the will. This agree-
ment is executed during the lives of both spouses, hence the name
"inter vivos election."
Numerous advantages may flow from the inclusion of a widow's
election will in the estate plan; some of the most compelling are
the favorable tax consequences when the wife elects to take under
a properly drafted will. Aside from the tax advantages, other
factors may make the use of such a will desirable." The nature of
S.W.2d 900 (1955); but cf. Hocker v. Piper, 2 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928)
error ref. (instructed verdict that an election was presented), it is a proper question for
summary adjudication. Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
'In a common-law jurisdiction, the wife may elect either (1) to accept the pro-
visions of the husband's will in lieu of her dower rights or statutory rights in his prop-
erty, or (2) to reject the benefits of his will and assert her rights at law. I de Funiak, op.
cit. supra note 5, § 217.
'See Cohen, Drafting Tax Clauses in a Will-Acquisition of Surviving Spouse's In-
terest in an Estate, 1957 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 549.
I Beveridge, Federal Estate Taxation § 5.08 (1956).
5 See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 820 (1945).
1" The most obvious non-tax factors are whether: (1) the wife desires the responsibility
of managing and controlling the entire community after the husband's death; (2) the
wife needs to be protected against her own inexperience and possible improvidence in
business and the management of investments; (3) a life estate in the entire community
will provide the wife with greater financial security than would outright ownership of
one half; (4) the husband desires to preserve the property for his children or other chosen
beneficiaries against possible dissipation by some future husband of the wife; or (5) the
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the community property system, with the husband being the sole
manager, presents the most important reason because the wife, often
inexperienced in business, receives the benefit of the husband's ex-
perience through his estate plan."
The purpose of this Comment is to develop the substantive law
of the widow's election in Texas, to explore the theories behind the
use of the inter vivos election, and to enumerate the tax consequences
of a widow's election will. Throughout this Comment it is assumed
that the wife survives the husband, unless the contrary is noted.
SUMMARY OF CONTENTS
Part I. Texas Substantive Law
I. The Doctrine Of Election
A. The Decedent's Will
B. A Benefit Must Be Received By The Electing Spouse
C. Inconsistent Rights Of The Survivor At Law And Under
The Will
D. Electing Spouse Must Adopt The Entire Contents Of The
Will
E. Equitable Estoppel
II. Property Subject To The Election
A. Rights Of Surviving Spouse At Law And By Will
B. Community Property
C. Homestead Or Allowance In Lieu Thereof
D. Exempt Property Or Allowance In Lieu Thereof
E. Right To A Family Allowance
F. Summary
III. Who May Exercise The Right Of Election
property is of such a nature as to warrant an election, e.g., a large portion of the prop-
erty consists of an integrated business or other inseparable assets which the husband
wishes to be continued under a single, experienced management with the ultimate view
that his son will eventually manage such property.
" As a practical matter, the husband may wish to write a letter to the wife to be
delivered after his death, in an attempt to keep her from electing against the will and
thereby destroying his estate plan. The purpose of such a letter is to explain the reasons
which prompted him to incorporate a widow's election will into the estate plan. This
approach may be especially helpful to the wife if she is inexperienced in business and
not likely to retain all of the facts concerning the husband's estate plan which he ex-
plained to her during his lifetime. For a discussion of a letter to a widow see Estate
Plans, Institute for Business Planning § 15,801.1. For an example of such a letter, al-
though not discussing a widow's election will, see Casey, Estate Planning Forms, Institute
for Business Planning S 25,103.
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IV. How The Surviving Spouse Effects An Election
A. Time Of Making The Election
B. Intent To Exercise An Election
C. Knowledge As A Prerequisite For Election
D. Express Or Implied Election
V. Effect Of Election
A. Effect On Other Portions Of The Estate
B. Acceleration Of Remainders
C. Failure To Elect
Part II. The Inter Vivos Election Agreement
I. Modification Of The Legal Community By Contract
II. California
III. Texas
A. The Prohibition Of Article 4610
B. Estoppel Of A Married Woman
IV. Conclusion
Part III. Tax Consequences In A Community Property State
I. Estate Tax Consequences Of The Widow's Election At The
Husband's Death
A. Composition Of The Husband's Gross Estate




II. Gift Tax Consequences Of The Widow's Election
A. The Wife's Renunciation As A Taxable Gift
B. The Wife's Election Under The Will As A Taxable Gift
C. Valuation Of The Gift
D. How To Avoid The Gift Tax Problem
III. Income Tax Consequences Of A Widow's Election Will
A. Possible Gain Recognized Upon The Wife's Election
B. How To Measure The Gain
C. Splitting The Subsequently Earned Income
IV. Estate Tax Consequences To The Wife Who Elects
A. The Code Provisions
B. Valuation For Purposes Of The Estate Tax




PART I: TEXAS SUBSTANTIVE LAW
I. THE DOCTRINE OF ELECTION
A. The Decedent's Will
1. Intent to Dispose of the Wife's Property
The husband's will does not present the wife with an election
unless the court is assured that his intention is (1) that his wife
shall be presented with the choice of either retaining the property
she presently owns or receiving property under the will," and (2)
that she shall not enjoy both of these inconsistent rights."' The
requisite intention is proved by showing that the husband attempted
to make a testamentary disposition of his wife's property or property
rights, 4 giving her some other property in its place."
If the husband does not attempt to make a testamentary disposi-
tion of his wife's property rights, it follows that no election is pre-
sented;" hence, the wife does not surrender her property rights by
accepting some interest under such a will,' since the will does not
purport to control the title to her property. 8 Further, the wife is
not estopped to claim her property rights at law as well as the bene-
fits under such a will; 9 she is entitled to both."
2. Presumptions
Historically, Texas courts have been reluctant to divest a widow
of her ownership of one half of the community property." Con-
sequently, a presumption has arisen that a testator intends to limit
his disposition to his own property," in which the surviving spouse
"Evans v. Jacobs, 249 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
"White v. Hebberd, 89 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
'4Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943); Chace v. Gregg, 88
Tex. 552, 32 S.W. 520 (1895); Wurth v. Scher, 327 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
"Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
'SAvery v. Johnson, 108 Tex. 294, 192 S.W. 542 (1917); Lee v. Powell, 285
S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Wolf v. Hartmangruber, 162 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1942); Baker v. Johnson, 64 S.W.2d 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Swilley v. Phil-
lips, 169 S.W. 1117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref.; see Commissioner v. Chase Man-
hattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
'"Swilley v. Phillips, supra note 16.
"SWaller v. Dickson, 229 S.W. 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
"Campbell v. Campbell, 215 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.; Autrey v.
Stubenrauch, 133 S.W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) error ref.
"Ottenhouse v. Paysinger, 244 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
"See Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959). As a result, the presumption has arisen that property in
the husband's possession upon the dissolution of the marriage is community unless proved
otherwise by the one seeking to establish it as his own. Wolf v. Hartmangruber, 162
S.W.2d 112 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
"Avery v. Johnson, 108 Tex. 294, 302, 192 S.W. 542, 544 (1917); Long v. Long,
252 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.; Ford v. Bachman, 203 S.W.2d
630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e.; Rippy v. Rippy, 49 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932) error ref.
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has no interest." The electing spouse has the burden of rebutting
this presumption. 4 This presumption (described as a "canon of con-
struction" by one court)" may be overcome (1) by unequivocal
language manifesting an intention to dispose of the survivor's prop-
erty,26 or (2) by "the strongest and most necessary implication"
from the four corners of the document that the testator intends to
dispose of another's property." Thus, if not rebutted by express
terms, the presumption stands unless the language "must be open
to no other construction" than that the will disposes of the survivor's
property.28 It is insufficient, however, that the will may be con-
strued to reveal an intention to dispose of the wife's property."
Finally, when the language itself does not rebut the presumption,"0
parol evidence may not contradict, add to, or explain the contents
of the will; nor may parol evidence import an intention to deprive
the survivor of her property if that intention is not displayed on the
face of the instrument."' The reasons usually given for the use of
this presumption are that (1) the decedent knows he cannot deprive
his wife of her property rights and therefore he must evidence a
clear intent to do so," and (2) the law deprives no one of their
property by mere conjecture."
3. Interpretations of the Language Used
The husband's will is regarded as unambiguous and as presenting
2Ellis v. Scott, 58 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.
24 Ibid.
22Arrington v. McDaniel, 4 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), modified, 14 S.W.2d
1009 (Tex. Comm. App. 1929).
2 6
Baldwin v. Baldwin, 134 Tex. 428, 135 S.W.2d 92 (1940); Avery v. Johnson, 108
Tex. 294, 192 S.W. 542 (1917); Moss v. Helsley, 60 Tex. 426 (1883); Sailer v. Furche,
22 S.W.2d 1065 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
27Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235, 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.; Ford
v. Bachman, 203 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e.; Packard v. De
Miranda, 146 S.W. 211, 214 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
" Lindsley v. Lindsley, 139 Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942); Baldwin v. Baldwin,
134 Tex. 428, 135 S.W.2d 92 (1940); Cheatham v. Mann, 133 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) error ref.; McJunkin v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 131 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939) error dism. judgm. cor.
"gHocker v. Piper, 2 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref.
3'Avery v. Johnson, 108 Tex. 294, 192 S.W. 542 (1917); Moss v. Helsley, 60 Tex.
426 (1883); Ford v. Bachman, 203 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e.;
Pope v. Pope, 175 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Whaley v. Quillin, 153 S.W.2d
969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref.
It seems clear that the wife's subsequent acts are immaterial in interpreting whether
the will actually presented an election situation, even if the acts would have effected an
election had the language presented an election. Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
21Schelb v. Sparenberg, 133 Tex. 17, 124 S.W.2d 322 (1939); Whaley v. Quillin,
supra note 30; Hocker v. Piper, 2 S.W.2d 997 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) error ref.
"2Lindsley v. Lindsley, 139 Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942).
3' Avery v. Johnson, 108 Tex. 294, 302, 192 S.W. 542, 544 (1917); Pope v. Pope,
175 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Whaley v. Quillin, 153 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1941) error ref.
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a clear case of election when it (1) specifically names or describes
the wife's property,34 or (2) devises "all that portion of land I own
that lies between . . ." in contravention of the wife's community
rights therein," or (3) devises the north one half of a tract of land
to the children of his first wife and the south one half of the same
tract to the children of the second wife, thereby denying the children
of his first wife the right to an undivided one half. " Conversely, a
will is regarded as unambiguous and as presenting no election when
the first person singular pronoun is accompanied by other words
which are indicative of the testator's intention, e.g., "land purchased
by me before my marriage," .my separate estate," and "money that
I may die possessed of in my separate right.""7
When the first person singular pronoun is used alone, however,
the testator's intention is not adequately expressed and the court
must interpret the will as an ambiguous instrument. For example,
the phrases "my estate" and "my property" do not show an un-
equivocal intent on the part of the testator to dispose of more than
his share of the community property and do not rebut the presump-
tion against such a testamentary disposition."8 The result is not
changed if the testator uses the first person singular pronoun stand-
ing alone in the dispositive provisions of the residuary clause, e.g.,
"residue of my property," 9 or "balance of my real estate,"" because
the subject of the devise is still "my property."41 Moreover, a devise
of "one half of my property" disposes of only one half of the
testator's one half of the community, i.e., one fourth of the total
3 4 Hodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955); Wright v. Wright, 154
Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955); Rogers v. Trevathan, 67 Tex. 406, 3 S.W. 569
(1887); Bumpass v. Johnson, 285 S.W. 272 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926); Leach v. Leach,
208 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Cheatham v. Mann, 133 S.W.2d
264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref. But see Ford v. Bachman, 203 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e., where a codicil which made a specific devise of a com-
munity property ranch to the wife for life, remainder to the husband's grandchildren,
was held to pass only the husband's community interest in the ranch because the pre-
sumption against one's intending to devise another's property was not rebutted by clear
language. It was reasoned that the specific language devising the ranch referred back to
the residuary clause which disposed of "all of my estate," and thus no election was pre-
sented.
"SChace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 52, 32 S.W. 520 (1895).
" Harkey v. Lackey, 259 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.37 Baker v. Johnson, 64 S.W.2d 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). See also Logan v. Logan,
112 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.
"SLong v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.; McDow
v. Lund, 250 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.; Ottenhouse v. Paysinger, 244
S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Slavin v. Greever, 209 S.W. 479 (Tex. Civ. App.
1919); Payne v. Farley, 178 S.W. 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
" Ward v. Gohlke, 279 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955) error ref.; Ford v. Bach-
man, 203 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) error ref. n.r.e.; Rippy v. Rippy, 49
S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref.
"°Avery v. Johnson, 108 Tex. 294, 192 S.W. 542 (1917).
41 Ibid.
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community estate."2 The following provisions dispose of only the
testator's property and do not present the survivor with an election:
(1) "property of which I die seized and possessed,"" (2) "all my
estate,"" (3) "all my property,"4 and (4) "all my estate of every
kind whatsoever, real, personal, and mixed, separate and com-
munity.""6 In addition to the basic presumption that one does not
intend to dispose of another's property, the following reasons compel
a finding that the first person singular pronoun conveys only the
testator's community interest: (1) the use of "seized and possessed"
means ownership; thus, there is no intent to dispose of the survivor's
share of the community," and (2) "my" is expressive of an intent
to dispose of only the testator's interest in the community."
If a will is to present an election even though these possessive
terms are used, the testator's intention to dispose of another's prop-
erty must be clearly expressed by other provisions." Circumstances
may manifest an intention to dispose of the entire community estate
although "my property" or similar terms are used." Thus, if the
husband makes a testamentary disposition of "all my property" but
specifically describes the community property, reciting that it is
his wife's separate property, 1 or otherwise describes the property in
such a way as to evidence an intention to dispose of property which
he does not own," the plain intention of the language is to present
an election." Similarly, when the husband's will creates a trust for
his wife and their son but the husband never owns sufficient property
to establish the trust, it has been held that "my estate" includes the
entire community because (1) it is used to describe the corpus of
the trust, (2) it is used interchangeably with "our estate," and (3)
4Church of Christ v. Wildfong, 265 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
"'Sailer v. Furche, 22 S.W.2d 1065 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930); Gulf, C. & S.F.
Ry. v. Brandenburg, 167 S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref.; Gibony v. Hutch-
eson, 50 S.W. 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899).
"Carroll v. Carroll, 20 Tex. 731 (1858); Wolf v. Hartmangruber, 162 S.W.2d 112
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Autrey v. Stubenrauch, 133 S.W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910)
error ref.
"'Pope v. Pope, 175 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Sauvage v. Wauhop, 143
S.W. 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error dism.
4 Waller v. Dickson, 229 S.W. 893 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
" Sailer v. Furche, 22 S.W.2d 1065 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930).
48Sauvage v. Wauhop, 143 S.W. 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error dism.
4 Long v. Long, 252 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
'°Delevan v. Thom, 244 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
" Cunningham v. Townsend, 291 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.5 Skaggs v. Deskin, 66 S.W. 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
5 3 Farmer v. Zinn, 276 S.W. 191 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925). See also Baldwin v.




a special clause (in this case) requires the wife to elect."4 Further,
"all my estate" has been construed as referring to the entire com-
munity estate5 when the wife is devised a life estate therein charged
with the support of a daughter with a restriction being placed on
the wife's power of sale and a clause stating that the husband intends
that the wife elect." Also, when an arbitrator, appointed by the
husband to construe his will, finds that an election is presented,
and it is not an unreasonable construction, the term "my estate"
is held to encompass the entire community. "' Finally, the practical
interpretation placed on an ambiguous will by all of the interest-
ed parties, viz., those acting under it throughout a period of
years, although not controlling, is given considerable weight in
arriving at a proper construction."8 Hence, when the interested parties
act for over fifteen years as if the will disposed of the entire com-
munity estate, the term "my estate" will be construed to be an
attempt to encompass all of the community property that was held
in the husband's name."'
B. A Benefit Must Be Received By The Electing Spouse
To present an election the will must contain an inducement to
take thereunder by giving some benefit to the surviving spouse to
which she would not be entitled at law."0 The determinative factor
is that the wife receives something under the will to which she is
not otherwise entitled, and the relative values of the right surrender-
ed and the right received are immaterial. 1 Of course, a testamentary
disposition of the surviving spouse's property is essential, but if
the wife does not receive a benefit under the will, she is not pre-
sented with an election although the will disposes of her property.
Furthermore, such a will is ineffective unless she expressly ratifies
it.62
54 McJunkin v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 131 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error
dism. judgm. cor.
"sCf. Munger v. Munger, 298 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.
56Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
"'Couts v. Holland, 107 S.W. 913 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908) error ref.
5 Baldwin v. Baldwin, 134 Tex. 428, 135 S.W.2d 92 (1940).
"9Ibid.; cf. Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943).
"OMayo v. Tudor's Heirs, 74 Tex. 471, 12 S.W. 117 (1889); Dakan v. Dakan, 52
S.W.2d 1070 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932), aff'd, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935). The
person making the election may be prompted to do so by considerations other than the
value of the property received. See Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App.
1923).
"
1 Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955). It was held in Smith
v. Butler, 85 Tex. 126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892), that although the benefit received was
smaller in value than the one surrendered, an election was presented.
6"Campbell v. Campbell, 215 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.; McClary
v. Duckworth, 57 S.W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) error ref.
1961]
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A discussion of when a benefit is actually received may be divided
into two general classifications, viz., benefits of a quantitative nature
and benefits of a qualitative nature. Quantitatively speaking, the
benefit may be a fee simple, a life estate, a leasehold, or other similar
interests. Qualitatively speaking, the benefit may be community prop-
erty, separate property, homestead rights, exempt property, and other
statutory allowances. "s
1. Life Estate in the Entire Community
In reference to the quantitative nature of the benefit, the will
must give the donee "some free disposable property" which can be-
come "compensation for what the testator sought to take away,""
4
and the benefit must be a material one."5 A common benefit given
the surviving spouse in lieu of her rights at law is a life estate in
the entire community." The courts have held that although (1)
the life estate is charged with the support of the children, (2) the
wife can not sell her interest therein, and (3) any excess above a
comfortable living for the wife must be invested in interest-bearing
securities for the remaindermen, the life estate is still regarded as
a benefit." Furthermore, if the wife predeceases her husband and
devises him a life estate in the entire community estate" or in her
separate property," he receives a sufficient benefit to require an
election. When the entire community estate and the homestead are
placed in trust for the wife's benefit during her lifetime (in order
to double her income) with the remainder to another, a material
benefit is presented in lieu of the strict homestead right and her
interest in the community.7 '
Closely akin to the life estate in the entire community and also
considered a benefit is a gift of all the rents and revenue from the
entire community estate to the wife for her lifetime,"1 or until she
"aThe qualitative nature of the benefit received is discussed in section II infra p. 100.
"4 Smith v. Butler, 85 Tex. 126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892).
'
5 Delevan v. Thom, 244 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
"See Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955); Farmer v. Zinn, 261
S.W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), aff'd, 276 S.W. 191 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925); Lee
v. McFarland, 46 S.W. 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) error ref.
"
7 Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923). In this case, however,
there was a clause which stated that the husband intended that the wife elect.
"Leach v. Leach, 208 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.
"Hodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955).
"°Delevan v. Thom, 244 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) (the wife was an in-
valid and of unsound mind). In the case of a joint will, a life estate in the entire com-
munity given to the survivor is a sufficient benefit to present an election situation. Chad-
wick v. Bristow, 146 Tex. 481, 208 S.W.2d 888 (1948); Dufner v. Haynen, 263 S.W.2d
662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
7 Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); cf. Gilroy v. Richards,
63 S.W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
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remarries."' The result is the same when the husband survives and
the wife has made a similar disposition to him."8 A will that gives the
wife the delay rentals on oil and gas leases'4 or a one-half interest in
the royalty due to the community free of community debts," re-
quires her to elect because of the benefit. Moreover, when the wife
is devised the homestead in fee, free of taxes, in lieu of her com-
munity property rights, the requisite benefit is received.76
2. Provisions of the Will in Excess of the Statute of Descent and
Distribution
Whether an election is presented when the benefits under the will
exceed the rights under the law of descent and distribution is the
subject of some conflict in the Texas cases. The same conflict exists
if the benefits under the law of descent and distribution exceed those
under the will. A vital distinction must be made between the cases
involving separate property and those involving community prop-
erty. When community property is involved, it is not clear whether
the survivor's interest passes as an inheritance or is owned outright
at law. In theory, the survivor's interest in the community passes
to her as an owner" and not as an inheritance. The courts have not
resolved this question with particularity because in either event
the survivor is entitled to one half of the community property upon
an election against the will." The Texas Supreme Court, in determin-
ing if a benefit is presented, recently held that when community
property is involved, it is improper to compare what the beneficiary
of the will received with what he would have received if there had
been no will." Rather, the test, followed by several cases, 1 is whether
the benefit is something of which the survivor cannot be deprived
"
2 Bumpass v. Johnson, 285 S.W. 272 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
" Cunningham v. Townsend, 291 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.
'Bradshaw v. Parkman, 254 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
" Baldwin v. Baldwin, 134 Tex. 428, 135 S.W.2d 92 (1940).
7 6 Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
" See Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 45.
76Slavin v. Greever, 209 S.W. 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
76Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Munger v.
Munger, 298 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref. See also Harkey v. Lackey, 259
S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e., where it was held that when the
wife died intestate before the husband, the children were put to an election either to
take under the husband's will, which attempted to dispose of the entire community es-
tate, or to take their intestate share from the wife.
88Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
"1 Hodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955); Cunningham v. Townsend,
291 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Pope v. Pope, 175 S.W.2d 289
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
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without her consent. In other cases,8 however, language may be
found indicating that an election is presented between the will and
rights under the "laws of descent and distribution" when one ex-
ceeds the other. Nevertheless, "laws of descent and distribution"
correctly refer only to the survivor's community which is owned
outright at the decedent's death; therefore, the survivor's inheritance
if there had been no will should be immaterial.
When separate property is involved, the above rationale is not
applicable because there is no separate property counterpart of sec-
tion 45 of the Texas Probate Code. In Von Koenneritz v. Hard-
castle" and Fairbanks v. McAllen," the argument that an incon-
sistency between the "laws of descent and distribution" and the will
presented an election situation was rejected. In White v. Hebberd,s
the inconsistency apparently was between the will and the laws of
intestacy. However, since the husband accepted a benefit under the
will he was estopped to elect against it. No other Texas case has con-
sidered the question of whether the surviving spouse has the right to
reject the will and take under the laws of intestacy when separate
property is involved.
It is believed that no Texas court will allow a surviving spouse to
elect against the will and claim anything other than his rights of
homestead, exempt property, and allowances. The surviving spouse
may not take his intestate share upon electing against the will except
to the extent that the decedent dies intestate as to some part of his
estate. The reason for this conclusion is that a testator does not
intend to die intestate as to any part of his estate which is disposed
of by the will; thus, the laws of descent and distribution are in-
applicable. Furthermore, section 45 of the Texas Probate Code should
be construed as merely stating the rights of the husband and the
wife in the community property. Only insofar as this section con-
trols the decedent's one half of the community should it be held
to be a statute of descent and distribution as to the surviving spouse.
3. Life Estate in the Decedent's Separate Property
A will that provides the wife with a life estate in the husband's
separate property subject to the homestead rights and separate per-
"
3 Cheatham v. Mann, 133 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error ref.; Langston
v. Robinson, 253 S.W. 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). See also Caddell v. Lufkin Land &
Lumber Co., 234 S.W. 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), aff'd, 255 S.W. 397 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1923).
83231 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.
84170 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref. (The inconsistency was between
the homestead rights at law and the will.)
8589 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
S8 Sev 4 Fa;e, Wills § 1388 (lifetime ed. 1941).
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sonalty,"7 or a fee in separate property which is subject to the home-
stead rights,9 contains the requisite benefit. The same is true when
the surviving spouse is entitled to one half of the personalty and
she is bequeathed all of the personalty,99 or all of the household
furniture.0
4. Other Benefits
The most extreme examples of wills which have been held to
confer the requisite benefit are found in two early Texas Supreme
Court cases. In Rogers v. Trevathan,9" a life estate in one half of the
entire community (including the homestead) was devised to the
wife and the other one half was devised to the children. The court
held that although the husband devised the wife's property to
another, a benefit was present because otherwise she would not have
been entitled to a homestead since the estate was solvent and under
the law at that time a solvent estate was subject to partition. In Wells
v. Petree," the advantage that accrued to the children from main-
taining the estate intact was held to be a benefit sufficient to require
an election.
C. Inconsistent Rights Of The Survivor At Law
And Under The Will
The benefit under the decedent's will must be inconsistent with
the surviving spouse's rights at law, or no election is presented. The
rights under the will and at law are clearly inconsistent when the
wife cannot take both without disappointing the will." In other
words, the wife's enjoyment of her rights at law must defeat some
provision of the will and she must relinquish some legal right or
interest in her property if she takes under the will." When these
8
7 Evans v. Jacobs, 249 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
"
5Whaley v. Quillin, 153 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref.; Nelson v.
Lyster, 74 S.W. 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
8 Smith v. Butler, 85 Tex. 126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892); Skaggs v. Deskin, 66 S.W.
793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902).
"°Pryor v, Pendleton, 92 Tex. 384, 47 S.W. 706, rev'd on rehearing, 92 Tex. 387,
49 S.W. 212 (1899).
9t67 Tex. 406, 3 S.W. 569 (1887).
92 9 Tex. 419 (1873) (decided by reconstruction court and not binding as author-
ity).
93 See Hodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955); McWhorter v. Gray,
4 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928); Nelson v. Lyster, 74 S.W. 54 (Tex. Civ. App.
1903).




factors exist, the wife must make a choice" regardless of the relative
value of the rights exchanged."
Conversely, if the wife can assert her rights at law and not frustrate
any provision of the will, no election is required."' For example,
no inconsistency exists when part of the estate is not devised by the
will and the beneficiary under the will also claims her portion thereof
as the surviving spouse." When the will specifically provides, how-
ever, that one right, e.g., a life estate in one half of the community,
is devised to the wife in lieu of her rights in the entire community,
an election is presented because of the inconsistency."
Probably the most common case of inconsistent rights occurs
when the husband's will disposes of the entire community estate in
disregard of the wife's community interest by devising a life estate
in the entire community to her, remainder to another!9' On the
other hand, when the husband's will clearly does not dispose of his
wife's property, but devises a life estate in his own property to her,
she does not surrender her title to one half of the community estate
by electing under the will, because taking under the will is not
inconsistent with her claim of absolute ownership of one half of the
community estate."'
D. Electing Spouse Must Adopt The Entire Contents Of The Will
At the heart of the doctrine of election is the rule of law that
one who accepts a benefit under the will must adopt the entire con-
tents of the will. Every right inconsistent with the will must be
renounced,' including any other interest in property of which the
s Bumpass v. Johnson, 285 S.W. 272 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
"Baldwin v. Baldwin, 134 Tex. 428, 135 S.W.2d 92 (1940); Bumpass v. Johnson,
supra note 95.
"
7 Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Baker v.
Johnson, 64 S.W.2d 1037 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Rippy v. Rippy, 49 S.W.2d 494
(Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref. In Philleo v. Holliday, 24 Tex. 38 (1859), although a
benefit was presented, no election was required because the rights were not inconsistent.
"Packard v. De Miranda, 146 S.W. 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
"Wells v. Petree, 39 Tex. 419 (1873). Although this case was decided by the re-
construction court, the result seems logically correct on this point.
""See Chace v. Gregg, 88 Tex. 552, 32 S.W. 520 (1895); Dunn v. Vinyard, 251
S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
"' Avery v. Johnson, 108 Tex. 294, 192 S.W. 542 (1917); Campbell v. Campbell,
215 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.; Hutchens v. Dresser, 196 S.W. 969
(Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error dism.; Swilley v. Phillips, 169 S.W. 1117 (Tex. Civ. App.
1914) error ref.; Sauvage v. Wauhop, 143 S.W. 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error dism.;
Haby v. Fuos, 25 S.W. 1121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
Miller v. Miller, 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex.
305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935); Smith v. Butler, 85 Tex. 126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892); Philleo
v. Holliday, 24 Tex. 38 (1859); Harkey v. Lackey, 259 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953) error ref. n.r.e.; White v. Hebberd, 89 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936);
Gilroy v, R~ich;rds, 6) S.W. 664 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).
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will disposes."03 In other words, the beneficiary under the will must
not occupy inconsistent positions with reference to any provision of
the will.' Thus, it is impossible to accept the favorable provisions
of the will and repudiate its unfavorable provisions."'
E. Equitable Estoppel
On occasion courts have resorted to a doctrine of equitable estoppel
which precludes the wife from occupying inconsistent positions with
reference to the will. 0" Generally, when a person pursues some
course of conduct or asserts a particular right or claim with full
knowledge of the facts and of his rights, he is estopped in equity
from assuming a subsequent position which is inconsistent with his
former conduct if such action would be to the detriment of another.
Therefore, when the wife has full knowledge of the condition and
extent of her husband's estate and of her duty to choose between
inconsistent rights, her election under one provision of the will
estops her from contesting the other provisions of the will." ' Equity
implies a condition that acceptance of a single benefit under a will,
to which one is not otherwise entitled, is acceptance of the will's
entire contents; and the electing spouse is estopped to claim an in-
consistent right... when another person may be harmed thereby.
10
"03Wurth v. Scher, 327 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Fairbanks v. McAllen,
170 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.
104Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 174 (1863); Smith v. Negley, 304 S.W.2d 464 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1957); Slavin v. Greever, 209 S.W. 479 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (dictum);
Nelson v. Lyster, 74 S.W. 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
"'Gillman v. Gillman, 313 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.;
Dufner v. Haynen, 263 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
'°oSee, e.g., Dunn v. Vinyard, 234 S.W. 99 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), rev'd on other
grounds, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923). (The commission of appeals held that
it was a question of fact whether the wife elected and it was not a proper subject for
an instructed verdict.) Where the husband does not devise property other than his own,
he is not estopped. Lee v. Powell, 285 S.W.2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955); Gulf, C. &
S.F. Ry. v. Brandenburg, 167 S.W. 170 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) error ref.
107 Bumpass v. Johnson, 285 S.W. 272 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926); Gillman v. Gillman,
313 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.; Von Koenneritz v. Hardcastle,
231 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref. n.r.e.; Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d
515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Langston v. Robinson, 253 S.W. 654 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1923). If the wife does not know or understand the effect of her acts, she is not
estopped by her election. Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th
Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 931 (1959); White v. Blackman, 168 S.W.2d 531
(Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.; Payne v. Farley, 178 S.W. 793 (Tex. Civ. App.
1915).
'
0 5Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935); Cunningham v. Town-
send, 291 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.; Bradshaw v. Parkman,
254 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.; Leach v. Leach, 208 S.W.2d
618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e.; Skaggs v. Deskin, 66 S.W. 793 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1902). Of course, where no benefit is received which is inconsistent with the
wife's rights at law, she is not estopped by accepting under the will. Autrey v. Stuben-
rauch, 133 S.W. 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910) error ref.
'O'Ellis v. Scott, 58 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.; contra, when
the other beneficiaries are not harmed, Pryor v. Pendleton, 92 Tex. 384, 47 S.W. 706,
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Although language in some cases indicates that a distinction may
be drawn between equitable estoppel and the rule of law that the
electing spouse must adopt the entire contents of the will, close
examination reveals no real difference. In Texas, because of the
blended system of law and equity, any difference is only superficial.
II. PROPERTY SUBJECT TO THE ELECTION
A. Rights Of Surviving Spouse At Law And By Wil55 0
A consideration of the surviving spouse's rights at law is necessary
in order to determine whether the decedent's will disposes of these
rights. The rights of a surviving spouse may be divided into two
classes: (1) those of which the decedent spouse may make a testa-
mentary disposition without the survivor's consent, and (2) those
of which the, decedent spouse may not make a testamentary disposi-
tion without the survivor's consent." An example of the first class
is the right of the surviving spouse to take as an heir under the laws
of descent and distribution in case of intestacy."" Examples of the
second class are (1) the survivor's one-half interest in the com-
munity estate,15t (2) the homestead right or the allowance in lieu
thereof,"" (3) the exempt property or the allowance in lieu there-
rev'd on rehearing, 92 Tex. 387, 49 S.W. 212 (1899). (On rehearing the wife was held
to have received a benefit which required her to elect, apparently to the detriment of the
other beneficiaries.) A common example of the application of the doctrine of estoppel
when the surviving spouse takes benefits under the will is the case of joint and mutual
wills. Murphy v. Slaton, 154 Tex. 35, 273 S.W.2d 588 (1954); Chadwick v. Bristow, 140;
Tex. 481, 208 S.W.2d 888 (1948); Dufner v. Haynen, 263 S.W.2d 662 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953) error ref. n.r.e. Although Texas does not allow the electing spouse to repudiate the
election, some states do allow a repudiation when unusual circumstances prevail. See
Annot., 81 A.L.R. 740 (1932), supplemented, 71 A.L.R.2d 943 (1960).
n. At common law the surviving widow has a right of dower in one third of the real
estate which her husband owned and which passes to her children by him. This is in
the form of a life estate. Curtesy is the surviving husband's right to a life estate in all
of the wife's property which passes to their children, if such children are born alive and
capable of inheriting the property. Where the husband's intention, as shown in his will,
is not apparent, a devise is presumed in addition to the wife's dower rights. Where, how-
ever, the husband shows a clear intent to make a gift in lieu of dower, then the full
effect is given to the intention and an election is presented. In many states, the common-
law rule has been changed by statute so that a provision in a will is presumed to be in
lieu of dower, unless the intention is that it be in addition to dower. In such a case,
an election is not necessary. See generally 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 86, at §§ 1350,
1351, 1352, 1353.
1.14 Page, op. cit. supra note 86, § 1394, at 12. Of course, it is possible to draft the
husband's will in such a way as to prevent the wife from claiming the benefits under
the will and also those of the statute, and to provide that she will be presented with an
election as to which she will take.
. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 37.
"' Tex. Const. art. 16, S I; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4619 (1960); Tex. Prob.
Code Ann. S 45.
"" Tex. Const. art. 16, §5 50, 51, 52; Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4618 (1960);
Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 271-85.
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of," and (4) the family allowance."' The doctrine of election is
concerned primarily with only the second class, as an election is not
presented unless two inconsistent and valid rights are in existence
at the same time.""
B. Community Property
As stated earlier, an attempted testamentary disposition of more
than the testator's one half of the community presents the surviving
spouse with an election."8 The survivor may take either his or her
community interest at law or the benefits under the decedent's will.""
The husband's will need not dispose of every item of the community
estate because particular provisions of the will may present the wife
with an election. Consequently, each provision must be examined to
determine if an election is required."' If one provision disposes of
the wife's community interest in exchange for some benefit, an
election situation is presented regardless of the effect of the other
provisions of the will."' If the husband's will does not attempt to
devise his wife's community interest to a third party but instead
gives it to her outright, she is not put to an election and may take
her community interest in addition to the benefits under the will."'
C. Homestead Or Allowance In Lieu Thereof
In Texas, the surviving spouse has a right to the use and occupancy
of the homestead for as long as he or she may elect."' Upon the death
of the first spouse, this peculiar right of homestead passes to the
survivor. Under the Texas Constitution the homestead property
passes according to the laws of descent and distribution, the same as
other real property, but it may not be partitioned among the heirs
so long as the survivor elects to use it." It is immaterial that the
title to the property which is subject to the homestead, i.e., "the
5 Tex. Const. art. 16, 9 49; Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 271-81.
11 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 286-93.
'574 Page, op. cit. supra note 86, § 1394.
.. There is a presumption that the husband intends to dispose of only his interest by
his will. See cases cited in note 22 supra.
'"Delevan v. Thom, 244 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
"'°Wright v. Wright, 154 Tex. 138, 274 S.W.2d 670 (1955).
... See ibid.
"'.Miller v. Miller, 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951).
".. The homestead is an exemption created early in the history of the Texas Republic.
Its purpose at the time of creation was to encourage colonization of the frontier. In gen-
eral, the homestead is protected from forced sale, mortgages, deeds of trust, and liens.
Tex. Const. art. 16, § 50. The homestead property consists of not more than 200 acres
in the rural area and of city lots of not more than $5,000 in value at the time of
acquisition, provided that it is used as a home or place of business. Tex. Const. art. 16,
5 51.
""Tex. Const. art. 16, S 52.
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underlying property," has vested in the heirs or is the separate prop-
erty of the decedent, to which the survivor has no claim.12 The
husband may not deprive his wife and children of the homestead
right by withdrawing the estate from administration in the county
court because equity will intervene and set the estate aside to the
wife as her homestead.12" If there is no homestead, the Texas Probate
Code provides for an allowance to the survivor in lieu of home-
stead."' Election under the will does not preclude the wife's claim
for an allowance in lieu of homestead unless the will expressly so
provides. "
As previously indicated, the statute apparently does not con-
template that the survivor's rights in the homestead will be defeated
merely by title descending and vesting in another person. An ex-
amination of the cases, however, reveals that an attempt by the
decedent to make a testamentary disposition of the underlying
property may terminate the homestead right. Thus, when the underly-
ing property is devised to one who is not entitled to assert the right of
homestead, without mentioning that the surviving spouse has a
homestead right therein or that the provisions of the will are to
be accepted in lieu of the homestead right, that right may be lost.
Although the cases apparently recognize the principle that the sur-
viving spouse is faced with an election between the provisions of
the will and her homestead rights only when the testator clearly
intends that the survivor is not to enjoy both, it is impossible to
predict with certainty when it will be held that the testator intends
to dispose of the survivor's homestead rights as well as the underlying
property.
1. Cases Which Present No Election
The cases holding that no election is required between the home-
stead rights at law and the provisions of the will are few in number,
with relatively simple facts. In Whaley v. Qu'illin,2 9 the wife was
not presented with an election when her husband's will devised her the
fee simple title to the underlying property because her acceptance
of the fee encompassd the homestead rights which were attached to
the property. However, by accepting the fee she may have elected to
take under the will and renounce all inconsistent rights."0
.2. Wicker v. Rowntree, 185 S.W.2d I0 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.o.m.
12. Runnels v. Runnels, 27 Tex. 515 (1864).
12. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 273 (not to exceed $5,000).
12. Lieber v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 331 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960) error ref.
n.r.e.
129 153 S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref.
13o Nelson v. Lyster, 74 S.W. 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
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a. When the Underlying Property is Community.-Often it is
difficult to determine if the election is caused by the community
nature of the underlying property or by the conflict between the
homestead rights and the will. In Mitchell v. Thompson,"' the will
did not clearly show whether the husband intended to devise the
entire community estate or only his one-half interest therein to his
daughter. The court held that the presumption that he intends to
dispose of only his interest was applicable, and even if he intended
to devise the entire community estate, such a devise would be in-
effective unless the wife made an express election to take under the
will. The wife, however, continued to occupy the homestead secured
to her by the Texas Constitution and did not elect to take under
the will. Hence, the daughter was only entitled to one half of the
community. In Smith v. Butler,"' the husband's will disposed of the
entire community, consisting of two tracts. It was held that the
wife's homestead right was not defeated by this disposition because
she was not presented with an election between the homestead and
the will. The homestead tract and the personalty were devised to
the wife for life, remainder to the daughter and her children, and
the non-homestead tract was devised to the son. Although the wife
elected to abide by her husband's testamentary disposition of the
community property, she was held to be entitled to her homestead
rights as well as to the exempt personalty. It is believed that this case
correctly states the rule pertaining to election whether the homestead
is attached to community property or separate property.
b. When the Underlying Property is Separate.-In light of the
constitutional provisions, it seems clear that the surviving spouse's
homestead rights are not defeated by the decedent's testamentary
disposition of the underlying separate property, nor is the survivor
presented with an election between the provisions of the will and
the homestead rights. Accordingly, in Haby v. Fuos,'33 the husband
made a testamentary disposition of an undivided one half of his
separate property, which was subject to the homestead, to his wife
in fee; the other undivided one half was devised to her for life,
remainder to the heirs of X. In a suit brought by the heirs of X
for their undivided one half, it was held that the wife did not have
to elect because the husband did not dispose of anything belonging
to her; hence, the heirs of X did not recover their undivided one
.. 286 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 292 S.W. 862
(Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
1 285 Tex. 126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892).
'2325 S.W. 1121 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
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half. Furthermore, her acts in taking inventory of the estate did
not impair her rights to the homestead." 4
2. Cases Presenting an Election
An analysis of the cases holding that the surviving spouse must
elect between the homestead rights at law and the benefits under the
will demonstrate that the principal question is whether the sole
cause of the election is the inconsistency between the disposition of
the underlying property and the homestead rights. If the will ex-
pressly states that the wife is to take its benefits in lieu of her home-
stead rights, rather than the homestead itself, an election is clearly
presented."3 Normally the husband may not encumber the home-
stead; but when the wife is the only one who can complain, she must
either accept the benefits of the will or retain the homestead
privilege.'
a. When the Underlying Property is Community.-Often the
courts do not distinguish between an inconsistency in the survivor's
community rights vis-i-vis the will and the homestead rights
vis-i-vis the will. In Wichita Valley Ry. v. Somerville,"' the hus-
band made a testamentary disposition of hotel property, which was
owned as community property and used as a homestead, by giving
a life estate in the rents to his wife, with the remainder to his son in
fee. His wife also received a bequest of the hotel furniture. Her sub-
sequent joinder in a deed of the fee and of the personal property
was held not to be an election to accept the benefits under the will
in lieu of her community and homestead rights. The reason was that
it was equally possible that the son rather than the wife claimed the
furniture (to which the wife had only an undivided interest at law).
Apparently, this court first looked to see if the wife had in fact
elected before deciding if the will presents an election situation; this
approach appears to be incorrect.
In Martin v. Moran,"' an election was found between: (1) the
wife's right to an allowance in lieu of homestead, and (2) the terms
of the husband's will, directing that the entire community estate of
$3,000 be used to erect five houses. The wife was to receive a life
... The court held that the only question was whether the estate was insolvent, thus
entitling the wife to an absolute fee under section 279 of the Texas Probate Code, or
solvent, thus entitling the wife to a life estate, remainder to the heirs of X. In either event
her right could not be defeated by the husband's testamentary disposition. Section 279
was declared unconstitutional by Lacy v. Lockett, 82 Tex. 190, 17 S.W. 916 (1891),
insofar as it attempts to pass the homestead to the wife in fee.
13'McCormick v. McNeel, 53 Tex. 15 (1880).
1a6 Ibid.
'37179 S.W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
'as 32 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
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estate in one of the houses and a portion of the rentals from the
others, but she collected all of the rentals, apparently repudiating
the will. It seems that the wife received the equivalent of a home-
stead by collecting the entire rental from the properties. Neverthe-
less, if she had claimed the entire $3,000 she might have been entitled
to it as an allowance in lieu of the homestead and exempt property.
The only inconsistency compelling the wife to elect seems to be
between the wife's community rights and the provisions of the will,
rather than between the will and the homestead. Apparently the
court also determined, although incorrectly, that the survivor had
elected in fact before ascertaining whether she was presented with
an election.
In Fairbanks v. McAllen, 3' the wife devised the community prop-
erty homestead to X, as long as X remained single, remainder over
to the four children, and bequeathed all of her personal property to
her husband." ' The husband's right to the homestead and one half
of the personalty "under the laws of descent and distribution" was
held inconsistent with the provisions of the will bequeathing all
personalty to him but depriving him of the homestead.141 Therefore,
his election to take all of the personalty under the will would pre-
clude him from claiming the homestead "under the laws of descent
and distribution." Any implication that an election must be made
between the will and rights "under the laws of decent and distribu-
tion" appears to be incorrect unless the latter phrase encompasses only
the husband's community interest. Nevertheless, the court correctly
required an election because of the inconsistency between the
statutory homestead right and the terms of the will.
In Delevan v. Thorn," ' the husband placed the entire community
estate in trust for his wife's support and maintenance because she
was unable to care either for herself or her property, and he gave
the trustee specific powers over the homestead, e.g., to sell in certain
instances. The court correctly ruled that the trustee's powers were
inconsistent with the wife's use and occupancy of the homestead;
therefore, the wife was presented with an election.
In Evans v. Jacobs,"3 the husband made a testamentary disposition
of the 213 acre homestead tract to his wife for life, remainder to the
four children. Although one half of this land was community and
the other half was his separate property, the will recited that the
"s 170 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error ref.
140 Cash, stock, and bonds in the amount of $74,377.
'Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 45. Apparently the personal property was community.
142 244 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
143 249 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
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entire tract was his separate property. The court held that since the
husband's will disposed of the entire community, the wife was pre-
sented with an election to take either her half of the community
or a life estate in the 2 13 acres. The wife accepted the life estate under
the will. Under these facts, the only inconsistency requiring an
election seems to be between the life estate in the husband's separate
property and his community interest vis-fi-vis the wife's community
interest which he disposed of under the will. Notwithstanding this
inconsistency, the wife still should be able to enjoy her homestead
rights in the underlying property since the right of homestead is
not inconsistent with either of these rights.'"
b. When the Underlying Property is Separate.-When separate
property is involved, it is usually easier to determine if an incon-
sistency between the will and the homestead rights exists, requiring
the survivor to elect. Generally, when the will places the underlying
property in trust, it is so encumbered that the surviving spouse
must elect between the will and the homestead rights. For example,
in Lindsley v. Lindsley,'4s the trustee's power over the husband's
separate property was held inconsistent with the wife's homestead
right therein, resulting in an election situation. The court stated:
The deceased spouse may not by testamentary provisions deprive the
survivor of the use and occupancy of the homestead .... [T]he will
does not by "express words" exclude the right sought to be enjoyed
by the surviving widow with respect to the homestead. . . . By this
we mean that the will does not in terms say that the bequests are to
be accepted in lieu of the homestead or exempt personal property
rights ...
Nevertheless, since the trustee was empowered to operate and rent
the property until delivered to the residuary legatee, the court found
this power inconsistent with the wife's right of use and occupancy
as a homestead. 4 Furthermore, since the wife actually elected under
the will, she was precluded from asserting her homestead rights in
addition to the benefits received under the will. The result of this
144Subsequently the wife ceased to reside on the homestead property and deeded 45
acres to X in fee, and all of her right, title, and interest in the remainder to him in
fee also. It was held that she could not convey a fee simple interest because all she
acquired under the will was a life estate. Since the homestead does not pass by the will
but arises under the constitution, merely because the wife does not receive the homestead
(or if she does receive it, later abandons it) should not prevent her from conveying the
life estate which she acquired by virtue of her election under the will. See Tex. Rev.
Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1290 (1945).
141 139 Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942).
... In this case the husband devised his entire separate estate to the executor and
trustee with directions that the wife was to receive the residence and 20 acres of the
500 acre farm in fee, that other specific devisees were to receive 60 acres, and that the
remainder was to be given to Southern Methodist University.
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case may be questioned, however, on the theory that the trustee took
the trust property subject to the homestead rights of the wife; thus,
no election was presented.
In Wicker v. Rowntree,'7 the wife made a testamentary disposition
of her separate property, which was burdened with her husband's
homestead rights, to the husband and the two daughters," 's share and
share alike. The husband claimed one third of the property in fee
under the will and also the homestead rights at law as the surviving
spouse. The court held that he was presented with an election to
renounce his rights under the will and enjoy the homestead or to
renounce his homestead rights and share equally with his daughters
under the will.' It is believed that this result is incorrect. No
election should be found under these facts because the exclusive
right of the surviving spouse to use and occupy the underlying
property as homestead is no more inconsistent with the fee owner-
ship of the property than any other possessory interest. Carried to
its logical end, this result would apparently prohibit one spouse from
possessing a homestead right in the other's separate property. More-
over, the testamentary disposition of a decedent should not destroy
the survivor's homestead right any more than the husband's inter
vivos conveyance of the underlying property destroys the home-
stead right when it is not made in accordance with the applicable
statutes."' The Texas Constitution, providing that the property
burdened with the homestead passes by the laws of descent and dis-
tribution, does not contemplate the result reached by this case. Thus,
to avoid an election situation under this decision, the testator should
expressly provide that the property is devised subject to the home-
stead rights of the surviving spouse.
147 185 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.o.m.
14 One daughter was married and the other was a feme sole; thus neither was entitled
to the homestead.
149The court recognized that: (1) the husband may enjoy a homestead in the wife's
separate property; (2) the wife may not deprive him of the homestead by her will;
(3) the homestead is not inherited but is a creation of the Texas Constitution; (4) since
the will does not expressly present the husband with an election, it must be determined
by manifest implication that it was the wife's intent to exclude him from the enjoyment
of the homestead right; (5) the enjoyment of a one-third fee simple interest by each
of the two daughters is inconsistent "with the exclusive right to use and occupy the
entire estate throughout his life should he choose"; (6) the fact that the husband may
enjoy his homestead right in the entire tract and at the same time enjoy a fee simple title
to an undivided one third is not the test, i.e., "his claim must not defeat or in any way
prevent the full effect and operation of every part of the will." Lindsley v. Lindsley, 139
Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942), is relied on as having a controlling fact situation, ap-
parently without noticing the important distinction resulting from the powers of the
trustee in that case.
"STex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. arts. 1300 (1945), 4618 (1960).
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In Miller v. Miller,'51 the husband devised his separate property
homestead of 233 acres to his wife and their seven children, share
and share alike, without mentioning his wife's homestead rights or
statutory exemptions. The wife contended that she was entitled to
(1) her one half of the community; (2) one eighth of the husband's
separate property in fee; (3) the exempt property; and (4) all of
her statutory allowances, including (a) a year's allowance," since
she had no separate property adequate for her maintenance, (b) the
allowance in lieu of exempt property, 53 and (c) the allowance in lieu
of the homestead.'54 The trial court held that the will did not require
an election and that she was entitled to all the property that she
claimed. Furthermore, all the allowances were held properly charge-
able to her husband's separate property and his one half of the
community.
The court of civil appeals15 reversed and rendered the trial court
only with regard to (1) the setting apart of exempt property to the
wife absolutely,"1' (2) the $1,000 allowance for support payable out
of the husband's separate estate," ' and (3) an allowance in lieu of
the homestead right.50 Although the wife did not complain of this
holding, the executor of the estate appealed to the Texas Supreme
Court, contending that the wife was required to elect either to take
under the will or to claim her rights at law.15
The supreme court, relying on, Lindsley v. Lindsley,"' sustained
the executor's contention and reversed the court of civil appeals
because a "manifest implication" from the will as a whole indicated
that the husband intended to deny the wife her statutory rights if
she accepted the benefits of the will.1"' It was presumed that the
husband knew he could not deprive his wife of those rights and that
a testamentary disposition of part of them would present an election
situation. The following inconsistencies between the statutory rights
.. 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951).
... Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 287, 288.
.. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 273 ($690 was claimed as the value of a truck that was
sold by the executors).
154 Ibid.
155230 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
158 The wife is entitled only to the use of the exempt property.
... The year's allowance for support is to be paid out of the community estate when
there is both separate and community property.
... The allowance in lieu of homestead is granted only when there is no existing home-
stead at the death of the first spouse.
... The executor conceded that the wife was not presented with an election between
the will and her community interest, and the court agreed.
"03139 Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942).
"' The holding of the court of civil appeals that there can be no allowance in lieu of
homestead in this case is apparently upheld as it is not mentioned.
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and the will were held to require an election: (1) the homestead
right of exclusive use and occupancy of 200 of 233 acres as provided
at law, vis-i-vis the fee in an undivided one eighth of the entire 233
acres in common with the seven children as provided by the will;
0 2
and (2) the use and power of disposition of the exempt personal
property for her maintenance, vis-i-vis the undivided one eighth
in all property after payment of the debts, under the will. 0'
In a concurring opinion Justice Garwood expressed the following
rationale. Whenever a husband makes a testamentary disposition of
his separate property to his wife and others, common experience
teaches that he believes this is the only property to which she is
entitled and the testamentary provisions usually are of equal value
with her statutory rights. In this situation the natural presumption
is that the husband intends to dispose of his wife's statutory rights
by negativing their application, unless rebutted by facts rendering
a contrary intent more probable. Such a presumption is not analog-
ous to the presumption that the testator intends to dispose of only
his own property. It is not common experience that a person intends
to dispose of another's property without explicit language making
such intention known. Admittedly, the wife's statutory rights are
property in a vague sense, but they are lost by abandonment and
are not considered property in the ordinary sense. Thus, they are
not within the ambit of the presumption that the testator intends
only to dispose of his own property.
Under these facts Justice Garwood reached the same result as the
majority opinion by what may be a more logical approach. His
presumption, however, appears to be limited to situations involving
statutory rights attached to separate property. If the property is
community, a conflicting presumption that the decedent intended
only to dispose of his own property arises. Thus, if the underlying
property is community, an exception to the general rule of construc-
tion would be necessary, viz., language showing an intent to negative
the survivor's statutory rights must be open to no other construc-
tion. This exception would require proof only that it is more probable
that the testator intended to negative the exemption rights than not.
The holding of the majority also appears to be limited to a situation
"'2This finding is in direct conflict with Wicker v. Rowntree, 185 S.W.2d 150 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945) error ref. w.o.m., which found that the fact that the husband can enjoy
his homestead right in the entire tract and at the same time enjoy a fee simple estate in
an undivided one third is not the test, and therefore not determinative of the fact that
there was no election. Merely because the fee simple title is not owned by the person
who is entitled to the homestead, should not destroy the homestead right since it is a
mere right to use the property and does not affect the fee ownership.
1"' The latter inconsistency will be discussed in the next section.
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where the homestead is attached to separate property. Even so limited,
an election is unnecessary since the wife can enjoy her homestead
right and at the same time own one eighth of the underlying fee.
In Oelkers v. Clemens, 4 the wife made a testamentary disposition
of $5,000 in cash to her husband. She devised her separate property,
which had been occupied as a homestead, to X. Subsequently, the
husband conveyed all of his right, title, and interest in the home-
stead to the executor of the estate in exchange for a fee interest in
other separate property. It was held that the husband must elect
either to assert his homestead rights or renounce them and take the
cash bequest under the will. The court reasoned that the provisions
of the will were inconsistent with the husband's statutory homestead
rights. Furthermore, the husband's conveyance of his right, title, and
interest in the homestead to the executor and acceptance of other
property in exchange was an election against the will. In other
words, the husband renounced his cash bequest under the will when
he asserted the homestead right by his act of conveyance. Miller v.
Miller was relied on as authority for the proposition that the rights
involved were inconsistent. This case is subject to the same criticism
as Miller v. Miller, viz., the rights are not inconsistent since the
husband could occupy the homestead even though the fee title has
been devised to another.
c. Rationale.-In theory, the wife's assertion of her homestead
right does not require an election because it is not inconsistent with
the fee ownership of the property. It is evident that at times an
election may be required whenever the husband attempts to make a
testamentary disposition of the underlying community property in
contravention of his wife's homestead rights therein. This result may
be explained in two ways: (1) in some cases the question of whether
an election is presented seems to be decided, although incorrectly,
by first looking to see if the surviving spouse has in fact elected, and
(2) in other cases it may be impossible to ascertain whether the wife
is asserting her homestead right or her rights in the community
property. Whenever it is possible to determine that it is the homestead
right which the wife asserts, as opposed to her community interest,
the assertion of that right should not defeat the husband's testamen-
tary disposition of the entire community or require an election any
more than her assertion of the homestead right prevents the underly-
ing community property from descending according to the laws
of descent and distribution under the Texas Constitution. When the
underlying property is the separate property of the decedent, a
14260 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
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fortiori, the survivor's assertion of homestead rights should not defeat
a testamentary disposition of the property or require an election
unless the will expressly stipulates that an election is intended.
D. Exempt Property Or Allowance In Lieu Thereof
The Texas Constitution' s and statutes'66 provide that certain
enumerated items of personal property shall be reserved to the
family, exempt from forced sale,"' and delivered to the widow or
other specified persons." 8 If the estate is solvent upon final settle-
ment,'69 the exempt property, except for the homestead, passes to
the heirs and distributees of the estate in the same manner as the
other property of the estate.' If any part of the enumerated exempt
property is not among the effects of the deceased, the court is
authorized to make a reasonable allowance in lieu thereof, not to
exceed $1,000. This amount is in addition to the allowance for the
widow's support.'' If necessary, the court may order a sale of so
much of the estate as is needed to provide the widow with the
allowance."'
Generally, the exempt property and the allowance in lieu thereof
receive the same treatment as the homestead right insofar as the
widow's election is concerned, i.e., they are statutory rights unaffect-
ed by testamentary disposition'. or withdrawal of the estate from
the court's administration." 4 In Ellis v. Scott,"' the wife, unsuccessful
in her contest of the probate of the husband's will, had both the
exempt property and the statutory allowance in lieu of exempt
property, unavailable in kind, set apart for her benefit. The will
directed the executors to prepare a suitable home for the wife. The
court, assuming that the will disposed of only the husband's separate
property, held that although she retained the statutory homestead,
i65 Tex. Const. art. 16, § 49.
'o1 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 3832 (1945).
S'lThis statute also provides for the setting apart of the homestead, but since that
is considered separately above, this discussion omits any reference to it.
16Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 272.
' Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 280. Exempt property and family allowances are excluded
in determining the solvency of the estate.
170 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 278. Section 279 of the Probate Code provides that if the
estate is insolvent the absolute title to the exempt property shall pass to the widow and
children. However, this section has been held unconstitutional. See note 134 supra.
"'. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 273.
"'. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 276.
"73Lindsley v. Lindsley, 139 Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942).
74 Runnels v. Runnels, 27 Tex. 516 (1864). The first Texas case to recognize the
possibility that the husband might present the wife with an election between the pro-
visions of the will and the exempt property was Little v. Birdwell, 27 Tex. 689 (1864).
In this case, however, the Texas Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether the
wife must elect between the will and her exempt property rights at law.
175 58 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.
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the wife must return the other allowances, viz., personal property
exempt from forced sale, before enjoying the benefits under the will.
Therefore, the wife's election to take her statutory allowances pre-
vents her from accepting the benefits under her husband's will since
the statute does not contemplate that she should take both. This case
correctly held that the assertion of the homestead is not such an
inconsistency as requires the survivor to erect. Apparently, when
only the separate property of the decedent is involved, an election
is correctly presented between the statutory exemptions and the will
because the allowances and exempt property must be charged against
that estate alone.
In Lindsley v. Lindsley,17s the husband bequeathed fifty books
from the family library to his wife, the balance to a charity to be
selected by a trustee. The wife alleged that since the will did not
expressly exclude her right to enjoy the exempt property (including
the remainder of the library to which she was entitled at law) she
was entitled to the other bequests under the will in addition to her
rights in the exempt property. Recognizing that the wife's right
to the statutory exemptions usually cannot be defeated by her
husband's testamentary disposition, the supreme court held, however,
that the wife's claim to the entire library defeated that part of the
will specifically providing for the disposition of the remainder of
the library; therefore, the wife was presented with an election.
In Miller v. Miller,'77 the wife claimed the benefits under her
husband's will in addition to the homestead, the allowance for a year's
maintenance, and the exempt personalty, all allowed by statute but
not mentioned in the will. The supreme court held that although
the husband confined his testamentary disposition to his property,
there was an inconsistency between her rights at law, i.e., to receive
all the exempt property, and her rights under the will, i.e., to re-
ceive an undivided one eighth of the exempt personalty. In other
words, the wife's election to take her full share of exempt personalty
would defeat other legacies. Thus, the election was actually based on
the inconsistency between the terms of the will and the survivor's
rights at law with regard to exempt property and not the alleged
inconsistency between the wife's homestead rights and the provisions
of the will.' The problem of election in reference to exempt per-
sonalty may be circumvented if the husband's will bequeathes all of
176 139 Tex. 512, 163 S.W.2d 633 (1942). This case also involved a fact situation
whereby the wife was put to an election between the homestead and provisions of the will.
171 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951). See text at note 151 supra for discussion
of election between the homestead rights and the will.
... See text at note 163 supra.
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the exempt personalty to his wife,79 as there would be no incon-
sistency between the wife's rights at law and under the will. Unlike
the homestead right, which may be enjoyed regardless of the owner-
ship of the underlying property, the failure to secure the exempt
property to the wife presents an election.
E. Right To A Family Allowance
The Texas Probate Code also provides that the court shall fix a
family allowance for the support of the widow and minor children8 °
in an amount sufficient for their maintenance for a period of one
year after the testator's death."1 No allowance is made for the wife
or minor children when they have property in their own right
adequate for their maintenance.' The question arises whether the
wife and the minor children are entitled to this allowance when
adequate provisions have been made for them by the husband's will,
i.e., whether the wife or the minor children may elect to take under
the husband's will and also claim the statutory family allowance.
In Trousdale v. Trousdale's Ex'rs,"' the supreme court held that
when the husband's will makes adequate provisions for the immediate
wants of his wife, although it fails to mention the family allowance,
the provision is intended to be in lieu of the year's allowance. When
the wife accepts the provisions made for her by her husband's will,
she may not receive the year's allowance which is bequeathed to
another unless she disclaims all rights under the will to which she
is not otherwise entitled."4 Accordingly, if a wife claims the family
allowance, she may not later claim the benefits under the will. 8 '
In Miller v. Miller,'8 the wife claimed the benefits under the will
17 Pope v. Pope, 175 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Whaley v. Quillin, 153
S.W.2d 969 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941) error ref.
... Tex. Prob. Code Ann. §§ 286, 291.
.1 Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 287.
... Tex. Prob. Code Ann. § 290.
18335 Tex. 756 (1872) (The wife's application for an allowance was denied). Al-
though this case was decided by the reconstruction court (1867-74), it appears to be in
accord with the majority rule on this particular point. At an early date, the Texas Supreme
Court was faced with this problem and decided that under the facts presented it was not
forced to decide if the wife can be compelled to elect between the will and the family
allowance. See Runnels v. Runnels, 27 Tex. 516 (1864); Little v. Birdwell, 27 Tex. 689
(1864). In Little v. Birdwell, although the court expressly denied that it was deciding the
question, it did in fact decide it by holding that as the estate was solvent and had been
ready for partitlon for over a year, the time had passed for making application for the
allowance. The court reasoned that since the wife had held the title to the property during
that time, she received the benefit of a year's allowance, which was all she claimed.
Merely because she failed to apply for the allowance within the statutory time, however,
did not cause her to lose these rights.
'"Nelson v. Lyster, 74 S.W. 54 (Tex. Civ. App. 1903).
... Cf. Ellis v. Scott, 58 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.
'go 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951). This case is previously discussed in relation
to the homestead rights and the rights to exempt property.
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in addition to the family allowance, the homestead, and the exempt
property. In discussing the inconsistencies between the wife's rights
at law and under the will, the court did not distinguish the family
allowance from the allowance in lieu of exempt property."7 After
holding that the wife must elect to take either under the will or that
which she receives by law,' the court concluded that if she takes
under the will, "she will have elected not to enjoy the benefits of
the exemption laws." Furthermore, if she repudiates the will, she is
entitled to her one half of the community property and "the benefits
of the exemption laws," although the family allowance is charged
against the entire community estate rather than the husband's com-
munity interest and separate property. Apparently the court con-
sidered "the benefits of the exemption laws" to include the family
allowance, and if the wife elects under the will, she is precluded from
claiming the family allowance also. As mentioned earlier, the con-
curring opinion of Justice Garwood would have decided the question
on the basis of the presumption that when the will makes some pro-
vision for the wife, the intent of the testator is to deprive her of
statutory exemption rights. This is probably true in the case of the
family allowance, but in the case of exempt personalty and home-
stead rights it cannot be said that such a presumption is founded on
common experience. This decision and its over-all effect is obscured
because three separate legal rights, viz., the homestead right, the
right to exempt personalty, and the family allowance, are treated
as a single, inseparable right.
F. Summary
In conclusion, it seems settled that when the will makes adequate
provisions for the wife and the minor children, they may not claim
both the benefits under the will and the family allowance. The terms
of the will presumably indicate that the testator intends to deprive
them of the statutory rights."9 Although the statutes creating these
rights are to be considered as being in pari materia,' it seems im-
187 149 Tex. at $50, 235 S.W.2d at 628 (1951), citing what is now §§ 278, 279 of
the Texas Probate Code:
Under the law the widow is entitled to all of the exempt personal property
to be used and disposed of by her as may be necessary for her support and
maintenance. She will not have to account for any part of this allowance
unless the estate, upon final settlement, should be solvent.
... The court apparently based its holding on the inconsistency between the will and
the right to exempt personalty at law, and possibly on the inconsistency between the
will and the right to the homestead. See discussion of these rights at notes 151, 177 supra.
... Such a presumption is similar to that made by Justice Garwood in the concurring
opinion in Miller v. Miller, 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951).
"°Eoff v. Pace, 25 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930), rev'd on other grounds, 48
S.W.2d 956 (Tex, Comm. App. 1932).
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proper to give them identical treatment since they are distinct and
different rights. The wife should be entitled to the exempt personalty
in addition to bequests under the will unless it is absolutely clear that
the husband intends the benefits under the will to be accepted in
lieu of the exempt personalty or the allowance in lieu thereof. In the
case of homestead rights it appears that the survivor is presented with
an election only when the testamentary disposition of the underlying
property is such that both the surviving spouse and the devisee can-
not enjoy the benefits therefrom. This test should be strictly con-
strued. The fact that one person owns the underlying fee title and
another person is entitled to enjoy the homestead rights is immaterial
in determining if the surviving spouse is put to an election.
III. WHO MAY EXERCISE THE RIGHT OF ELECTION
The right of election is personal and usually may be exercised
only by the party entitled to it,'' provided he or she is competent to
make the election."9 ' This rule prevents the right from inuring to
the benefit of someone for whom it is not intended; yet, when the
beneficiary is mentally incompetent, as in Delevan v. Thorn, "3 it is
impossible for her to make an election. In that case, the question was
who possessed the right to elect for the wife's benefit, i.e., the
guardian, the probate court, or the district court. It was held that:
(1) The right of election is not such a property right as would
constitute part of the estate committed to the guardian's care, and
the guardian, therefore, could not exercise the right in the absence
of statutory authority.'94 (2) The probate court could not grant full
relief if it exercised the right of election because the action would
be ex parte since the trustees of the estate were not subject to its
jurisdiction. The trustees, however, were vitally affected if that court
exercised the right because the trust would lapse and the property
would pass into the control of the probate court if it renounced the
will on the wife's behalf. (3) The district court, with the broader
constitutional grant of jurisdiction, is the proper court to exercise
the wife's right of election.
When a child is presented with an election, the district court may
elect for him.' Also, in Colden v. Alexander,'." it was held that the
... Broughton v. Millis, 67 S.W.2d 650 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) (will did not require
an election).
1924 Page, Wills § 1361 (lifetime ed. 1941).
193 244 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951).
'"See 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 192, § 1363; Annot., 74 A.L.R. 452 (1931), sup-
plemented, 147 A.L.R. 336 (1943).
"'Kerens Nat'l Bank v. Stockton, 281 S.W. 580 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'd on
other grounds, 120 Tex. 546, 40 S.W.2d 7 (1931).
I°s141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943).
1961]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1$
district court could partition and close the estate as if the wife had
elected under the will because she could not refrain from electing
and prevent the termination of the administration of the estate.
If the election had not been made during the lifetime of the person
entitled to elect, her heirs or personal representatives may not elect
for her upon her death, " even if the decedent were incompetent at
death, " unless the will shows that the testator intended the right of
election to pass to them."' Apparently, however, the personal nature
of the right does not prevent it from being delegated to an agent
under a general power of attorney,209 at least when the agent acts
under the direction of the one entitled to elect."' Finally, when the
right of election is exercisable at the option of several beneficiaries,
all must concur in the election before it may be effected.'
IV. HOW THE SURVIVING SPOUSE EFFECTS AN ELECTION
A. Time Of Making The Election
Because no statute prescribes the time within which an election
must be made, equity implies a reasonable time."3 The surviving
spouse need not elect until after the probate proceeding," although
an election may be made before the will is probated.' In Smith v.
Butler,' the wife was not too late in asserting her rights at law six
months after her husband died and five months after the probate
of the will. On the other hand, it is too late to assert statutory rights
for support or allowances when the estate is ready for partition and
distribution to the beneficiaries' ° or is ready for closing. " Finally,
in Farmer v. Zinn,"" it was held that when the wife accepted bene-
fits under the will for ten years, it was then too late to assert in-
consistent rights at law.
'"There are no Texas cases on this point. See Annot., 85 A.L.R. 856 (1933).
108See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 452, 456 (1931), supplemented, 147 A.L.R. 336, 351
(1943).
194 Page, op. cit. supra note 192, § 1362.
2'°See Annot., 85 A.L.R. 856, 859 (1933).
'0' 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 192, § 1361.
'2 Id. at § 1364.
'o3See Runnels v. Runnels, 27 Tex. 516 (1864); Harkey v. Lackey, 259 S.W.2d 641
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.; 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 192, § 1365.
"
0 4 Mitchell v. Thompson, 286 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'd on other
grounds, 292 S.W. 862 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
50 Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
206 85 Tex. 126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892).
2'Little v. Birdwell, 27 Tex. 689 (1864).
'O'Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943); Oelkers v. Clemens,
260 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
20261 S.W. 1073 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), aff'd, 276 S.W. 191 (Tex. Comm. App.
1925).
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B. Intent To Exercise An Election
For the surviving spouse to effect an election under the will, she
must intend to elect 1' or accept benefits under the will which are
inconsistent with her rights at law."' The question of intent be-
comes especially important when the election is implied .12 rather than
expressed.213 Moreover, when the person with the power to elect
does not intend to elect to take under the will, no election is made."'*
When the surviving spouse's conduct is inconsistent with the asser-
tion of one of two inconsistent rights, he or she is held to have
elected that right which is consistent with prior conduct.2 ' Acts
which do not clearly indicate whether the survivor elects to take
under a will do not show an election and apparently the survivor
takes his estate at law.216
C. Knowledge As A Prerequisite For Election
Closely akin to the question of whether the wife intends to elect
under the will or assert her rights at law is the question of whether
she has adequate knowledge of (1) her rights at law, (2) the con-
dition and extent of the estate, and (3) a duty to choose between
inconsistent rights.1  The problem is primarily a fact question.1
Thus, when the wife is not appraised of her community rights and
it cannot be ascertained whether her actions are in recognition of
the will or in opposition to it, she has not elected under the will,
but rather she takes against it."'
When the wife fails to plead and prove a state of facts relieving
her of the effect of her election, i.e., that she did not have sufficient
210 Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); Mitchell v. Thomp-
son, 286 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'd on other grounds, 292 S.W. 862 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1927).
211Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
212 Express and implied elections are discussed in the text at note 229 infra.21 Wurth v. Scher, 327 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
24 White v. Blackman, 168 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.;
Payne v. Farley, 178 S.W. 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
214 Page, op. cit. supra note 192, S 1366.
21'See Wichita Valley Ry. v. Somerville, 179 S.W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915);
Martin v. Moran, 32 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895). Since the wife acted in ignorance
of her rights, she is not estopped in a subsequent repudiation of the will.
217As stated in Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043, 1046 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923):
In the absence of statutory regulation, it may be generally said that two
things are necessary in order that acts relied upon will amount to an elec-
tion: First, the party must have had knowledge of his rights; that is, he
must have had knowledge of the condition and extent of the estate, and
of his duty to choose between the inconsistent rights; second, that he in-
tended to elect, as shown by his words and acts, viewed in the light of all
the circumstances.21 6Wurth v. Scher, 327 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959). This case reversed and
remanded a summary judgment that the wife had elected.
2
"Martin v. Moran, 32 S.W. 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895).
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knowledge, she is bound thereby. Thus, in Buinpass v. Johnson,22 °
when the wife's attorney read the will to her as executrix of the
estate and she collected rents from the land in accordance with the
terms thereof, she was held to have sufficient knowledge of the
condition and extent of the estate to know that the community
property was disposed of by the will. The court pointed out that a
party need not know the exact extent of legal rights or the exact
legal effect of a choice in order to effect an election. When the wife
receives benefits221 or elects under a will after she is fully informed
of the facts and circumstances, she has waived any right to complain
about the failure of anyone previously to appraise her of specific
devises of her property.22
Therefore, when the wife accepts a benefit in ignorance of a
material fact, knowledge of 'which is necessary to enable her to
make an intelligent choice, she is not estopped to assert contrary
rights at a later date, 2 1 especially if no one is harmed thereby.2  For
example, in Logan v. Logan, 2 the wife's ignorance of the existence
of a partnership trust between her husband and a son (by virtue of
which the husband and son owned one half of the property which
she claimed as community survivor) was held to prevent her from
being bound by any prior election under the will. Finally, even
if a wife is in doubt as to her rights, she cannot be bound by accept-
ing a class bequest under a will because she does not know that
she has a choice between inconsistent rights.225
Since a wife must have the requisite knowledge before she is bound
by her election, she is not required to elect until the status of the
legal title is determined in the probate proceeding.22 ' Furthermore,
no election is required until it is determined whether the estate is
free from the claims of creditors.2
220285 S.W. 272 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
21Langston v. Robinson, 253 S.W. 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
222Gillman v. Gillman, 313 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958) error ref. n.r.e.
222White v. Blackman, 168 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) error ref. w.o.m.;
Logan v. Logan, 112 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism.; Payne v. Farley,
178 S.W. 793 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); see Annot. 81 A.L.R. 740 (1932), supplemented,
71 A.L.R.2d 943 (1960).
124 Packard v. De Miranda, 146 S.W. 211 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912) error ref.
225 112 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) error dism. In this case, however, it was
decided that since the wife would own the same interest in the community estate after
the will was probated as she would if she asserted her rights under the statute, she was
not put to an election.
226 See Rippy v. Rippy, 49 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932) error ref. (dictum).
227 Colden v. Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 171 S.W.2d 328 (1943).
22Leach v. Leach, 208 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) error ref. n.r.e. See gen-
erally text at note 203 supra.
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D. Express Or Implied Election
Generally, an election is made expressly. However, an election
may be implied if the party's acts are clearly and unequivocally
made with the requisite knowledge and intention."' When the
election is implied, the question of intention must be decided from
all of the facts and circumstances in the particular case.' Intention
to elect .31 and knowledge of one's rights.3. are ordinarily fact
questions, and as in all fact questions, they should be submitted to
the jury for determination.' If reasonable minds could not differ as to
the effect of the acts and declarations of the surviving spouse, then
the election may be effected as a matter of law.'
1. Effect of an Express Declaration
When the survivor acts under an express agreement that such
acts shall not operate to her prejudice, no election under the will is
effected because of the lack of intent to elect.3 ' A declaration that
a beneficiary intends to elect to take under or to take against a
will, or a mere expression of satisfaction with a will, may not be
an election.'3' An election is effected, however, when such a declara-
tion is made in writing, expressing a clear intent to elect,' e.g.,
executing a receipt for benefits received under the will and releas-
ing the executor from any and all liability,"' or filing an agreement
in court to take under the will.' 3' In Evans v. Jacobs," ' the wife was
.. Wurth v. Scher, 327 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); 4 Page, op. cit. supra
note 192, § 1366.
2" Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 143 S.W.2d 906 (1940); Gorman v. Gause, 56
S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933); Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm.
App. 1923). Where a joint will, a joint and mutual will, or a mutual will is involved,
the survivor's acts in probating the will and accepting benefits, Murphy v. Slaton, 154
Tex. 35, 273 S.W.2d 588 (1954), or doing the above in addition to taking possession of
property and qualifying as an independent executor, Chadwick v. Bristow, 146 Tex.
481, 208 S.W.2d 888 (1948), show an election.
" aFarmer v. Zinn, 276 S.W. 191 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925); Wurth v. Scher, 327
S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Leach v. Leach, 208 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. Civ. App.
1948) error ref. n.r.e.
2' Williams v. Emberson, 55 S.W. 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900).
233 Jones v. Guy, 135 Tex. 398, 143 S.W.2d 906 (1940); Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex.
305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935); Mayo v. Tudor's Heirs, 74 Tex. 471, 12 S.W. 117 (1889);
Dunn v. Vinyard, 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923); Wichita Valley Ry. v.
Somerville, 179 S.W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915).
... White v. Hebberd, 89 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
2"Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
"'.4 Page, op. cit. supra note 192, § 1366; see Rippy v. Rippy, 49 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932) error ref.
..
7 Caddell v. Lufkin Land & Lumber Co., 234 S.W. 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921), aff'd,
255 S.W. 397 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
21 Von Koenneritz v. Hardcastle, 231 S.W.2d 498 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950) error ref.
n.r.e.
23 9 Huston v. Colonial Trust Co., 266 S.W.2d 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) error ref.
n.r.e.; McJunkin v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 131 S.W.2d 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) error
dism. judgm. cor.
24 249 S.W.2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref. n.r.e.
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held to have elected to take under the will because she expressed
satisfaction with it, received property under it, and collected rents
from her husband's land. Also, when a wife insisted that her hus-
band's will be carried out after she was informed of her right of
election and she joined the beneficiaries in turning the property over
to the court, it was held that she elected to take under the will."4 1
2. Effect of Acceptance of Benefits
As previously pointed out, acceptance of benefits under a will...
with full knowledge of the facts!"3 prevents the survivor from
subsequently asserting inconsistent rights. Moreover, one who accepts
a benefit under a will in a binding manner surrenders the right to
contest its validity; the theory is that a legatee whose only interest
is in sustaining the will cannot play the role of an heir who may
have an interest in contesting it." Accordingly, it is held that if
the manner in which a wife deals with property after her husband's
death indicates an election, ' e.g., by selling the property, ' she is
bound by the election and may not subsequently allege inconsistent
rights at law. A wife's recognition of her husband's will and the
acceptance of benefits thereunder, followed by a subsequent parti-
tion of the estate and conveyance to the remaindermen in accordance
with the will, has been held to indicate her election to take under
the will.4 7
In many jurisdictions, a conflict of authority exists as to whether
the acceptance of property under a decree of distribution not in con-
formity with the terms of a will constitutes an election against
the will. 's In Floyd v. Seay,45 the wife took both her community
and separate property in addition to her rights under the will. The
children acquiesced in the executor's partition and distribution of
241 Smith v. Butler, 85 Tex. 126, 19 S.W. 1083 (1892).
242 Cunningham v. Townsend, 291 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) error ref. n.r.e.;
House v. Rogers, 23 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), aff'd, 39 S.W.2d 1111 (Tex.
Comm. App. 1931); see Lieber v. Mercantile Nat'l Bank, 331 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1960) error ref. n.r.e.
243Bumpass v. Johnson, 285 S.W. 272 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926).
244 Smith v. Negley, 304 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). See Buckner Orphan's
Home v. Berry, 332 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960), where the wife probated and
accepted benefits under one will, but was dissatisfied and subsequently produced a later
will. She was held estopped to claim under the second will because she had elected under
the first one and could not later contest it. In this case, however, the wife released all of her
interest in the estate which transferred any property she would have received under the
second will to the executor.
'" Lee v. McFarland, 46 S.W. 281 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898) error ref.
246 Oelkers v. Clemens, 260 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.;
Chace v. Gregg, 31 S.W. 76 (Tex. Civ. App.), aff'd, 88 Tex. 552, 32 S.W. 520 (1895).
... Rogers v. Trevathan, 67 Tex. 406, 3 S.W. 569 (1887).
2464 Page, Wills § 1366 (lifetime ed. 1941).
240 196 S.W. 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) error ref.
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the estate with full knowledge that the will did not dispose of the
wife's rights at law. The court held that the children were estopped
to claim that the wife elected under the will."'0
3. Effect of Offering the Will for Probate
In several jurisdictions, a division of authority exists as to whether
the offering of the will for probate constitutes an election under it."'
In Texas, usually, this factor is considered along with other circum-
stances by the fact-finder. For example, when the wife offers the
will for probate, inventories the property, is the sole beneficiary,
and is named independent executrix, such factors do not constitute
an election under the will if she does not receive a benefit to which
she is not otherwise entitled.' On the other hand, an election to take
under the will is effected when the wife receives a benefit to which
she is not otherwise entitled, in addition to filing the will for probate
and disposing of the property in exact accordance with its terms."'
Whether the wife has elected under the will by failing to object to
the executor's listing of all the property in the inventory as separate
property, when she knows it is community, is a jury question." '
However, the court, in St. Mary's Orphan Asylum v. Masterson,"'
held that the wife did not elect to take against the will by making
an agreement with the child of her husband (1) not to probate
the will, and (2) to take only a half interest, leaving the remainder
to be divided equally among the other children. Finally, when a
husband's will is not offered for probate until after the wife's
subsequent death and the wife never mentions the will or indicates
her election to take under it but merely occupies the property to
which she is entitled at law, she does not elect to take under the
will.'58
4. Effect of Qualifying as an Executor
In several jurisdictions, one who qualifies as an executor has there-
by elected under the will and may not claim any interest adverse
... In this case the will did not show an intent to present an election. Furthermore,
the wife mortgaged the property and the mortgagee's rights would be prejudiced unless
the children were estopped to claim that the wife elected under the will.
"' 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 248, § 1367.
"' Campbell v. Campbell, 215 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) error ref.; McClary
v. Duckworth, 57 S.W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) error ref.
'"Farmer v. Zinn, 276 S.W. 191 (Tex. Comm. App. 1925) (the wife filed an in-
ventory in addition to other acts); Bradshaw v. Parkman, 254 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
... Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 83 S.W.2d 620 (1935).
255 122 S.W. 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909) error ref.
.5. Mitchell v. Thompson, 286 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'd on other
grounds, 292 S.W. 862 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927) (The court of civil appeals affirmed
an instructed verdict on this point).
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thereto."7 The theory is that the oath of the executor to carry out
the will estops him from later rejecting its terms. In Dunn v.
Vinyard,"' however, the wife filed the will for probate and produced
an inventory in conjunction with the other executors. The wife
expressed satisfaction with the will and all of her acts were consistent
with its terms. The court held that her acts, such as joining in the
application for probate, taking the oath as executrix, and filing an
inventory and appraisement of her husband's property are cogent
evidence of the intent to elect under the will and should be submitted
to the jury. Similarly, in Wurth v. Scber,"' the court ruled that the
question of the wife's election under the will by qualifying as
independent executrix, filing an inventory, and selling the property
with the son's joinder was for the jury. In some cases, however, the
evidence conclusively establishes an election under the will in the
absence of a contrary expression of intention. For example, in
Langston v. Robinson,"' the wife elected under the husband's will
by probating it, qualifying as independent executrix, and being the
sole devisee. The same result was reached as a matter of law in White
v. Hebberd,"' when the husband received letters testamentary, acted
as independent executor, secured a three-year extension of a loan
with the help of other executors, occupied the homestead for two
years while he acted as executor, refused to waive his life estate in
the property devised by the will, and sought to have a legal determi-
nation made of his rights in the property as fixed by the will.
5. Effect of Recognizing the Executor
The survivor's recognition of the executor as such does not con-
stitute an election to take under, or an estoppel to deny, the will's
provisions if the act causes no injury to other legatees.262 Likewise,
prosecution of a suit to determine one's rights under a will does
not result in an election.26 Finally, the survivor's act of giving a
power of attorney and later revoking it before anyone has changed
his position in reliance thereon does not constitute sufficient proof
of an intent to elect. "
2" See 4 Page, op. cit. supra note 248, § 1367.
256 251 S.W. 1043 (Tex. Comm. App. 1923).
25' 327 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
260253 S.W. 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
261 89 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
262Pryor v. Pendleton, 92 Tex. 384, 47 S.W. 706, rev'd on other grounds on re-
hearing, 92 Tex. 387, 49 S.W. 212 (1899).
203 Hodge v. Ellis, 154 Tex. 341, 277 S.W.2d 900 (1955); White v. Hebberd, 89
S.W.2d 482 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).264 Miller v. Miller, 149 Tex. 543, 235 S.W.2d 624 (1951).
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V. EFFECT OF ELECTION
A. Effect On Other Portions Of The Estate
Although a surviving spouse's election against the will necessarily
disrupts the testator's plan of distribution, when the testamentary
scheme is not entirely destroyed, it is the court's duty to carry out
the testator's purposes as if the electing spouse were dead." 5 Generally,
an election to take against the will does not affect the will; only the
rights of the electing spouse are affected."' Obviously, in some
situations an election to take against the will destroys the testa-
mentary scheme to such an extent that the remaining provisions of
the will cannot be carried out in accordance with the testator's in-
tention. As a result, the will must be disregarded and the remainder
of the estate distributed according to the laws of descent and
distribution.
A testator may specify what portion of his estate should bear
any loss occasioned by the wife's election against the will."6 ' The
court should construe the will to give effect to the testator's inten-
tion when it is clear that he intends to create a trust out of his
separate property and one half of the community property, irrespec-
tive of whether the wife elects under the will (which would pass
her one half of the community to the trust).26 In the absence of
an expression of intent by the testator, the loss should fall either
upon the beneficiaries generally or upon those portions of the estate
from which provision for the wife is to be made."' In Pope v.
Pope,"' however, it was stated by way of dictum that the wife may
not exercise a right of election which would defeat the minor child's
right of election to take exempt property and support payments.
Normally, beneficiaries must contribute in order to make up the
losses occasioned by the election, the residuary estate usually being
held liable for the first contribution.'' On the other hand, the
testator's devise to the electing spouse may be the recoupment to the
other beneficiaries for the loss sustained as a result of the election
against the will.7
26 Munger v. Munger, 298 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.
266Ellis v. Scott, 58 S.W.2d 194 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) error dism.
267 See cases collected in Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 291, 295 (1954).
266 McDow v. Lund, 250 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952) error ref.; see generally
Munger v. Munger, 298 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.
269 See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 291 (1954).
270 175 S.W.2d 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
672 See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 291, 296 (1954).
2
7 1 Id. at 306.
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B. Acceleration Of Remainders
A wife's election to take against the will and the concomitant
renunciation of her benefits under the will does not defeat a vested
remainder which is dependent upon her renounced portion unless
the testator clearly intends to accomplish such a result." 3 Similarly,
as in Munger v. Munger,"7 4 when a wife has been devised a life estate
with remainder to the children, the wife's election to take against
the will does not affect the rights of the other beneficiaries. The
dominant intention of the testator was that the corpus go to his
daughters. Since the wife's election to take against the will should
have been anticipated by the husband, it was tantamount to her
death as respects the payment of income to, or taking possession of,
property by the remaindermen."7 ' Thus, the election caused the ac-
celeration of income from the remaining half of the community
estate to the daughter's benefit.
A conflict of authority exists in other states as to whether a
contingent remainder may be accelerated when the contigency has
not yet occurred."' No Texas case has decided this point, and the
majority of other jurisdictions hold that such a remainder may not
be accelerated."' When the election against the will and the attendant
acceleration of remainders occasions a loss to other beneficiaries, as
well as the remaindermen, the principle of acceleration of remainders
comes into conflict with the rules for compensating the disappointed
beneficiaries."' In other words, when the remainderman is allowed
to enjoy his gift immediately while the estates of other beneficiaries
are diminished to make up the share of the electing spouse, the
problem is which claim, viz., that of the beneficiaries or that of the
remainderman, has precedence over the renounced estate.7 The
answer, of course, is governed by the intent of the testator when as-
certainable. " ' If the testator's intent is not clear, a doctrine has been
developed which provides that the remainder following the renounced
life estate is not accelerated, but instead the life estate is sequestered
to compensate the beneficiaries whose shares are reduced by the
2734 Page, op. cit supra note 248, § 1390.
74 298 S.W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) error ref.
272 Forsythe v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank, 81 S.W.2d 1103 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935),
rev'd on other grounds, 130 Tex. 563, 109 S.W.2d 1046 (1937); Simes and Smith, Future
Interests § 797 (2d ed. 1956).
27.4 Page, op. cit. supra note 248, 5 1390; Simes and Smith, op. cit. supra note 275,
§ 796.
2774 Page, op. cit. supra note 248, 5 1390.
271 Ibid. See Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d 291, 313 (1954).27 American Law of Property § 21.44 (1952).
2804 Page, op. cit. supra note 248, § 1390.
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spouse's election."8' Of course, if the wife's election does not sub-
stantially distort the testator's dispositive plan, sequestration is not
needed. In practical effect, therefore, the doctrine of sequestration
largely forestalls the effect of the doctrine of acceleration of re-
mainders, particularly insofar as the renounced estate is needed to
compensate disappointed beneficiaries.
C. Failure To Elect
In the absence of a statute, the effect of the surviving spouse's
failure to elect generally arises only after the survivor's death. The
reason is that in the ordinary situation the only limitation upon an
election is estoppel, and then only when the rights of third parties
are involved. 2 ' Although no relevant statute exists in Texas, a
judicial limitation has been imposed upon the electing spouse in the
form of a time limit. "' When the time for election has passed or
the electing spouse dies without electing, the question is whether
the spouse is entitled to the property under the will or to the rights
at law. A mere intention to elect unaccompanied by an act with full
knowledge of the circumstances is not an election to take under a
will, no matter how often the intent is expressed.8 4 After a sufficient
time for electing has lapsed, the electing spouse retains her interest
in the property and is not held to have elected to take under the
will. 8' In the absence of an express election, a surviving wife must
do some act with the intent that it be an election. 8 or she has in
fact not elected.87 Such an act is the acceptance of benefits under
the will to which she is not otherwise entitled. If she does not re-
ceive benefits of some value, she has not elected. "
In other states, in the absence of a statute, the electing spouse who
dies before electing is presumed to have elected the more valuable
right, and unless the rights at law are clearly more beneficial, the
presumption is in favor of an election to take under the will."8
Statutes enacted with reference to the election problem usually re-
28S American Law of Property § 21.44 (1952); but see Restatement, Property § 234
(1940) (adopts the view that the renounced interest of the wife is sequestered).
2124 Page, op. cit. supra note 248, § 1372.
285 See text at note 203 supra.
284 Mitchell v. Thompson, 286 S.W. 642 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926), rev'd on other
grounds, 292 S.W. 862 (Tex. Comm. App. 1927).
285Harkey v. Lackey, 259 S.W.2d 641 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) error ref. n.r.e.
28 Wurth v. Scher, 327 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
27 'Pryor v. Pendleton, 49 S.W. 403 (Tex. Civ. App. 1898), aff'd, 92 Tex. 384, 47
S.W. 706, rev'd on rehearing, 92 Tex. 387, 49 S.W. 212 (1899). On rehearing the
supreme court found that the daughter had in fact accepted a benefit to which she was
not otherwise entitled and therefore was estopped to claim adversely to the will to the
detriment of the other beneficiaries.
288McClary v. Duckworth, 57 S.W. 317 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900) error ref.
2884 Page, op. cit. supra note 248, 5 1372.
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quire an election only in accordance with the general rules of
equity.29 Many statutes provide that failure to make a written
election results in a waiver of rights at law and constitutes an elec-
tion to take under the will. Some statutes, however, provide for the
opposite result.291
PART II: THE INTER VIVOS ELECTION AGREEMENT
I. MODIFICATION OF THE LEGAL COMMUNITY BY CONTRACT
In Texas,"2 as opposed to the old Spanish system of community
property from which the Texas law was derived,293 the spouses may
not execute any contract (either ante-nuptial or post-nuptial)9 .
which alters or modifies the legal community. In the old Spanish
system, 2 and in all other community property states,9 ' the parties
may execute marital contracts before marriage. Some state statutes
prohibit contracts that "alter the legal orders of descent,2 9.. but in
several states the parties may contract between themselves as to
the nature of their property and may freely convey the property
to one another.9 The growth of the Texas doctrine of election may
well represent an effort to evade the prohibition against contracts
which "alter the legal orders of descent."2 9 In other words, that
which is prohibited during marriage is accomplished after the death
of one spouse by a testamentary disposition of the entire community,
followed by the survivor's election to accept the will in lieu of the
community rights. The development of the election doctrine is more
obvious in California where the principles of community property
have been distorted frequently by common-law concepts. This dis-
tortion is evidenced by decisions holding that the "community
property" is actually owned by the husband, with the wife having
a mere expectancy in one half, which vests at the husband's death."0
290 Id. at § 1374.
294 Page, op. cit. supra note 248, § 1378.
292 Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4610 (1960).
293 See Las Siete Partidas, Part 4, Title 11, Law 24 ( 2 de Funiak, Community Property
36 (1943)).29 Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957).
295 See note 293 supra.
290 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-201 (1956); Cal. Civ. Code § 158; Idaho Code Ann.
§5 32-905, 32-906 (1947); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2325 (West 1952); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 123.070, 123.080 (1959); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4610 (1960); Wash. Rev.
Code § 26.16.120 (1952); Comment, 25 Wash. L. Rev. 165 (1950).
297 Ariz. Rev. Star. Ann. § 25-201 (1956); Roden v. Roden, 29 Ariz. 398, 242 Pac.
337 (1926) (does not apply to post-separation agreements); La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2326
(West 1952); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4610 (1960); Las Siete Partidas, Part 4,
Title 11, Law 24 (2 de Funiak, Community Property 36 (1943)).
... Cal. Civ. Code 5 158; Idaho Code Ann. 5§ 32-905, 32-906 (1947); Nev. Rev.





In California, where the inter vivos election has been used most
extensively, the parties may contract between themselves as to the
nature of the community property."1 Thus, the California courts
recognize the contractual nature of a transaction whereby the hus-
band executes a will and the wife appends thereto a written waiver
of her community rights and an election to take under the will."02
In effect, the wife is electing to take under her husband's will during
his lifetime. By this technique, the husband restricts the wife's
freedom of choice to some extent, by determining during his life-
time if she will abide by the provisions of his will.
The theory and effect of the decisions and the tax results of
restricting the wife's freedom of choice are not clear under California
law. First, the unilateral or bilateral nature of the contract and the
obligations of the parties prior to the husband's death are indefinite."°
Of course, the nature of the contract is determined by examining
the instrument itself. If it is unilateral, with the consideration for
the wife's election being the existence of the will unaltered at the
husband's death, no liability results to the husband if he subsequently
revokes or changes the will. Moreover, the wife may change her mind
before the husband dies without incurring liability. Only upon the
husband's death does a unilateral contract arise by which both parties
are bound.3 In Gains v. California Trust Co.,"°3 the California court
spoke of a legally implied promise by the husband, arising when the
wife executes the election agreement, that he will not make a testa-
mentary disposition other than the one to which the wife's waiver
is attached. Under this theory the contract is governed by section
158 of the California Civil Code, which subjects the parties to the
rules controlling contracts between persons occupying a confidential
relationship toward each other. Thus, if one spouse obtains an ad-
vantage over the other, it is presumed that the transaction was
entered into under undue influence. Otherwise, the parties are bound
by the agreement, and if the husband revokes the will or materially
changes it, the wife has an action at law for damages or in equity
for specific performance if damages are inadequate. In the Gains
30' See Cal. Civ. Code § 158.
303Flanagan v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 213 Cal. 664, 3 P.2d 307 (1931); In re Whitney's
Estate, 171 Cal. 750, 154 Pac. 855 (1916); Gains v. California Trust Co., 48 Cal. App. 2d
709, 121 P.2d 28 (1942); In re Wyss' Estate, 112 Cal. App. 487, 297 Pac. 100 (1931);
O'Neil v. Ross, 98 Cal. App. 306, 277 Pac. 123 (1929).
303 See generally Brown and Sherman, Election to Take by Will - Some Practical Con-
siderations, 23 Calif. S.B.J. 11 (1948); Note, 20 Calif. L. Rev. 219 (1932).
'0 O'Neil v. Ross, 98 Cal. App. 306, 277 Pac. 123 (1929) (dictum).30s48 Cal. App. 2d 709, 121 P.2d 28 (1942).
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case, the wife was allowed to repudiate the waiver and election to
take under the will because the value of her benefit under the will was
less than her share of the community property. It was held that the
waiver and election were to her disadvantage under section 158 of
the California Civil Code. Such a monetary disadvantage may be
present whenever the wife receives a life estate in the entire com-
munity, with remainder to the children, in exchange for relinquish-
ing her community interest, especially when the wife is past middle
age. Thus, even in California it is not certain that the wife is bound
by the inter vivos election although the transaction should be an
enforceable contract. In In re Wyss' Estate, °s the California court
indicated that estoppel is the basis upon which the wife's inter vivos
election binds her when she does not revoke the election before her
husband's death. Having permitted her husband to die with a will
executed in reliance upon her election to take under it, the wife is
estopped to revoke her election after his death. No inter vivos transfer
of the wife's interest in the community property is made by virtue of
the inter vivos election; instead, it is a conditional promise by the wife
to permit the entire community to be controlled by the husband's
will. The condition is that he make no changes in his will subsequent
to the execution of the election agreement. The consideration for
the wife's promise is the execution of the husband's will.
III. TEXAS
Two major obstacles may prevent a Texas court from holding
that an inter vivos election agreement is valid and enforceable. One
is the prohibition of article 4610"" against contracts between husband
and wife which "alter the legal orders of descent," and thus change
the nature of the property; and the second is the hesitancy of Texas
courts to enforce estoppel against a married woman.
A. The Prohibition Of Article 4610
The courts' interpretation of article 4610 apparently prohibits
the parties from contracting as to the nature of property to be
30 112 Cal. App. 487, 297 Pac. 100 (1931).
'0°Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. (1960). Article 4610 reads as follows:
Parties intending to marry may enter into such stipulations as they may de-
sire, provided they be not contrary to good morals or to some rule of law;
and in no case shall they enter into an agreement, or make any renunciation,
the object of which would be to alter the legal orders of descent, either
with respect to themselves, in what concerns the inheritance of their child-
ren or posterity, which either may have by any other person, or in respect
to their common children; nor shall they make any agreement to impair the
legal rights of the husband over the persons of their common children. No
matrimonial agreement shall be altered after the celebration of the marriage.
[Vol. 1 $
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acquired."'8 Although the statute expressly refers only to ante-
nuptial contracts, the courts have extended its application to post-
nuptial contracts.""° When article 4610 was enacted,"'° the Texas
laws were quite different than they are today; and the article should
be read with this in mind."' The "forced heirship" statute, to which
article 4610 originally referred, has been repealed; thus, the article
should not invalidate contracts on the ground that they "alter the
legal orders of descent." Obviously, "the legal orders of descent"
refers to the old "forced heirship" statute and not to the statute of
descent and distribution. While it is beyond the scope of this Com-
°'SGorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933). Here it was held that
the constitution and statutes defined the nature of property and the "rules of law" for
purposes of article 4610. Thus, since the legislature does not have the power to enlarge
the wife's separate property beyond constitutional limits, Arnold v. Leonard, 114 Tex.
535, 273 S.W. 799 (1925), the parties themselves cannot do so by agreement.
.. Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957). The basis for this
extension is said to be public policy.
310 January 20, 1840, 4 Laws of the Republic of Texas 3 (2 Gammel's Laws of Texas
179 (1898)).
a11 At that time Texas had a "forced heirship" statute which was enacted on January
28, 1840, 4 Laws of the Republic of Texas 167 (2 Gammel's Laws of Texas 344 (1898)).
It appears that article 4610 was originally intended to refer to the "forced heirship"
statute, which was subsequently repealed on July 24, 1856. In 1879, George W. Paschal
specifically refers to the annotations under the statute which repealed the "forced heir-
ship" statute (article 3868, Paschal's Annotated Digest 644 (2d ed. 1870)) in his
discussion of article 4632 (now article 4610). See Paschal's Annotated Digest 773 (2d ed.
1870). Thus, it appears that a well-informed person writing in the early history of the
state considers article 4610 to refer to the "forced heirship" statute. This conclusion is
further strengthened by the fact that article 4610 was adopted from the Louisiana Civil
Code arts. 2035-10 (1825), La. Civ. Code arts. 2325-2330 (1870), and that code provides
for "forced heirship" at article 1495.
If Gorman v. Gause, 56 S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933), is followed in Texas,
the marriage contract will be practically nullified. In Gorman v. Gause, the court reasoned
that article 4610 allows contracts which are not contrary to some "rule of law." Since
the constitution and statutes which define community property are "rules of law," any
contract which is contrary to them is invalid. It seems significant that the agreement in
Gorman v. Gause purported to change all of the property which was acquired during the
marriage from community to the separate property of the one who acquired it. Moreover,
the enforcement of the agreement would have resulted in the wife's exclusion from partici-
pation in what would have been a community estate of $70,000. This opinion does not
indicate, however, that such a contract would be invalid even if it were fair and equitable
to the wife. There is dictum at page 858 which indicates that such a contract would be
valid if phrased in terms of promises to convey property after it is acquired rather than
changing the nature of it as it is acquired. It is believed that article 4610 does not re-
quire the result reached in this case, but that this case was decided as it was in order to
achieve justice for the wife.
It was the purpose of the 1840 legislature to allow the husband and wife some free-
dom in contracting before marriage, but Gorman v. Gause is in direct opposition to that
purpose and should not be followed. The validity of marriage contracts in Louisiana under
the statutes from which article 4610 was derived strengthens this conclusion. See Dag-
gett, The Community Property System of Louisiana 114-18 (2d ed 1945); Huie, The
Texas Constitutional Definition of the Wife's Separate Property, 35 Texas L. Rev. 1054-67
(1957). Gorman v. Gause was decided nearly 100 years after the passage of the 1840
statute. It has been suggested that by this time the court was too far out of contact with
the civil law system to carry out the full meaning of the statute permitting ante-nuptial
contracts. See Huie, Some Basic Principles of Texas Community Property Law, Comparative
Studies in Community Property Law 114, 130 (Charmatz U Daggett ed. 1955).
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ment to consider the various constructions of article 4610, it is
sufficient to note that the clause "to alter the legal orders of de-
scent . . . in what concerns the inheritance of their children..."
has been construed as referring to the laws of descent and distribu-
tion."' Therefore, the statute has been given a far broader meaning
than apparently was intended.
In at least three instances a contract which operates "to alter
the legal orders of descent" (referring to the statute of descent and
distribution) may be held valid. These three exceptions to the prohibi-
tion of article 4610 are: (1) the partition of community property by
husband and wife; (2) a division of community property in con-
junction with a permanent separation; and (3) a contract to make
a will, when actually followed by a will. These exceptions will be
considered in the order enumerated.
The Texas Constitution"' authorizes the husband and wife to
partition community property or exchange the community interest
of one spouse in any property for the community interest of the
other spouse in other community property. Article 4624a 14 provides
that the partition shall be effectuated by a written instrument sub-
scribed and acknowledged by both spouses in the manner required
by law for the conveyance of realty. Such an instrument obviously
alters "the legal orders of descent" because thereafter such partitioned
property is the separate property of the respective spouses.
When the parties have separated with the intention that the separa-
tion shall be permanent, a subsequent agreement dividing their
property apparently is valid, if fair and equitable."' Moreover, an
agreement to divide property in contemplation of permanent separa-
tion may be valid although executed before separation.' Both ex-
amples alter "the legal orders of descent." Since the cases that support
the above examples were decided before the constitutional amend-
ment authorizing partition of community property was enacted, the
formalities required by the amendment when executing the agree-
ment apparently are not essential.
A contract to make a will, followed by the actual making of the
will, is enforceable although it alters "the legal orders of descent."
.. Weidner v. Crowther, 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957); Groesbeck v. Groes-
beck, 78 Tex. 664, 14 S.W. 792 (1890).
.1. Tex. Const. art. 16, § 15.
'
4 Tex. Rev. (fiv. Stat. Ann. (1960).
"' Cox v. Mailander, 178 S.W. 1012 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915) error ref. (dictum). In this
case, however, the division was not fair and equitable.
8"1Gorman v. Gause, 36 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) (dictum), aff'd, 56
S.W.2d 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933). No mention was made of the dictum in the opinion
by the comrhissign of appeals.
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In Johnson v. Durst,31 ' for example, the husband contracted to devise
all the property he owned at his death to his wife's nieces in con-
sideration of his wife's promise not to revoke her will devising all of
her property to him. The court held that such a contract does not
deprive the husband of his right of inheritance; instead, it gives
him a greater share of the wife's estate than he would have received
under the laws of descent and distribution. Therefore, the "legal
orders of descent" are not altered. Since there were no children
of the marriage, no one was harmed, and consequently no one was
in a position to urge the contract's invalidity. In Graser v. Graser,",
the husband and wife executed a contract, written entirely in the
husband's handwriting, disposing of the entire community estate.
When the husband died, the wife probated the document as his will.
Upon the wife's subsequent death the instrument was refused pro-
bate as the wife's will because it lacked proper execution, i.e., it had
an insufficient number of witnesses. It was held to be the husband's
holographic will; thus, the wife died intestate. Furthermore, article
4610 was said to invalidate an instrument executed as a contract
to make a will when the instrument is not followed by the execution
of a will, because only a will can "alter the legal orders of descent."
It was admitted that the statute's purpose is to protect the children
of the marriage and they may not be estopped by any conduct of
the wife which tends to ratify the contract. Weidner v. Crowther"'
involved a contract to make a will which would "alter the legal
orders of descent." It was held that article 4610 does not invalidate
the contract if it is followed by a joint and mutual will incorporating
its terms, since the statutes authorize all persons to make a testa-
mentary disposition of their own property. These examples indicate
that article 4610 does not absolutely prohibit contracts which change
the "legal orders of descent." Unless the contract purports to change
the nature of property to be acquired or takes advantage of the
wife, it should be upheld by the Texas courts.
The inter vivos election does not change the nature of the prop-
erty owned by the spouses, or that which is to be acquired, although
it does permit all of the property to pass in accordance with the
husband's will. In this sense it is analogous to the joint and mutual
will. In neither case does the instrument change the "legal orders
of descent," which the courts have interpreted to mean statutes of
descent and distribution. If this reasoning is sound, problems arise
31 115 S.W.2d 1000 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) error dism.
3 147 Tex. 404, 215 S.W.2d 867 (1948).
319 157 Tex. 240, 301 S.W.2d 621 (1957).
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as to the time when the parties become bound and as to the nature
of their respective obligations. Unsatisfactory as it is, the California
law gives the only indication of what the answers may be. In no
event, however, should the inter vivos election agreement be suscep-
tible to the construction that it passes a property interest to the
deceased spouse. If such a construction is possible, the agreement
will be void as an agreement to change the nature of property held
by husband and wife in contravention of article 16, section 15 of
the Texas Constitution. Furthermore, such a construction would
yield undesirable tax consequences.
B. Estoppel Of A Married Woman
Aside from the several theories with reference to an enforceable
contract, the inter vivos election agreement may be valid because
the wife is estopped to revoke it. The theory behind an estoppel is
that the husband di'es with his estate plan constructed in reliance
upon her agreement to elect to take under the will, and her failure
to do so will upset the estate plan. Logically, the inter vivos election
is not an ordinary contract (which the wife is prevented from
making because of her contractual incapacity) and the wife should
be susceptible to the doctrine of estoppel. The Texas courts, how-
ever, do not estop a married woman when, as in Gorman v. Gause,"'
another person will receive an advantage at her expense. When
property greatly changes in value, a situation may arise at the
husband's death whereby the wife will be immune to the doctrine
of estoppel under the rule of Gorman v. Gause. If, however, an
arm's length transaction is effected and the benefits to the wife are
explained to her by her own counsel and are sufficiently great to
induce her to execute an inter vivos election agreement for her
own "economic self-interest,".''s she may be estopped. In such a case,
every element of estoppel would be present, viz., an act by the wife
coupled with reasonable reliance by the husband to his detriment.
The question most likely to arise is whether the husband may reason-
ably rely upon the wife's inter vivos election. Of course, a finding
of overreaching on the husband's part greatly diminishes his prospects
of obtaining a finding of reasonable reliance. If, however, no ad-
vantage is taken of the wife, the husband should be entitled to rely
reasonably upon the inter vivos election. Especially is this true if the
wife has had her disabilities removed by proper court action."' In
520 56 S.W.2d. 855 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933).
21 Westfall, Estate Planning and the Widow's Election, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1269, 1278
(1958). This phrase is coined to indicate that the wife is prompted to elect to take under
the will solely because of the economic benefits she may receive.
a2Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 4626 (1960). Although the wording limits the
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such a case, the wife has the capacity to deal for herself. Therefore,
she should be amenable to the doctrine of estoppel, at least when
she is guilty of positive acts of fraud." 3 The theory upon which
the wife is estopped in such a case is the same as that upon which
promissory estoppel is based. If substantial injustice would be caused
by the wife's revocation of her inter vivos election agreement, e.g.,
by diminishing the share of a child who is a remainderman, the case
for estoppel of the wife seems even stronger.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although there is no assurance that an inter vivos election agree-
ment is valid in Texas, no harm results in executing one simulta-
neously with the husband's will, provided the husband is informed
that his whole estate plan may fail if the agreement is not upheld.
If an agreement is executed, the wife may feel a moral obligation
to her husband which would deter her from attempting to repudiate
her election after his death. The foregoing suggestions and theories
are some of the alternatives a Texas court may adopt in support of
a holding that an inter vivos election is binding upon the wife after
the husband's death. If a fair and just election agreement is drafted,
that does not take advantage of the wife, it should control. The
inter vivos election is subject to the same rules that govern election
at death and these elements must be kept in mind when the agree-
ment is executed. If such an election agreement is valid in Texas,
it will be a great aid to estate planning. "
wife's contractual powers to business and trading purposes, there is authority for the prop-
osition that the courts will indulge in a broad interpretation of the statute and place little
limitation on the type of agreement executed. See George v. Dupignac, 273 S.W. 934
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) error ref.; Comment, 13 Sw. L.J. 84, 101 (1959).
3
2
3 See Brown v. Federal Land Bank, 180 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944) error
ref. w.m.; Vickery v. Republic Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 170 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1943) error ref. w.o.m.; Comment, 25 Texas L. Rev. 657, 663 (1947).
824 An inter vivos election agreement should anticipate such questions as whether the
wife is entitled to a probate homestead, exempt property, and a family allowance. The
following form is taken from "Forms of Wills and Trusts," distributed by Security-First
National Bank of Los Angeles:
Election and Waiver on the Part of the Wife
I - .---------------... wife of --------............. hereby certify that I have read the
foregoing Will of my husband and fully understand that he disposes not only
of his separate property but also of our community property now owned or
hereafter to be acquired, if any, including my half of that property. Being
fully satisfied with its provisions, I hereby elect to accept and acquiesce in
the provisions of the Will, waiving all claims to my share of any community
property and all other claims that I may have upon any of the property dis-
posed of by the Will, but not including my right to a family allowance out
of my husband's estate during probate (optional: or to a probate homestead
and to property exempt from execution). This instrument is not a transfer
or release of my right, title or estate in any property now owned or hereafter
acquired by me, is revocable by written instrument executed by me and de-
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The tax situation of the parties should not be affected by an
inter vivos election agreement.' Although the wife is deprived of
her freedom of election when the husband dies, there is no reason
to include her property in his gross estate,"' especially since the
instrument does not transfer any property interest to the husband
before his death.
PART III: TAX CONSEQUENCES IN A
COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATE
For purposes of this part, unless otherwise indicated, the follow-
ing assumptions are made: (1) the husband is the first spouse to
die;3. (2) the husband's will provides that the entire community
estate, including the wife's one half, shall be placed in trust with a
life estate in the entire corpus reserved to the wife, remainder over
to the children; and (3) neither spouse owns separate property. The
problem in regard to whether the wife may elect to take her home-
stead, family allowance, and exempt property, in addition to bene-
fits under the husband's will, are beyond the scope of this part.
Therefore, it will be assumed that the husband's will makes adequate
provisions for the wife with reference to these items and that she is
not faced with an election between them and the provisions of
the will.
livered to my husband during his lifetime, and shall be effective and valid
for any purpose only after the decease of my husband and provided I survive
him, and upon the condition that the foregoing Will shall be duly admitted
to probate by a court of competent jurisdiction and that it shall not be suc-
cessfully contested or probate revoked.
Dated at .....................-,-the ------------ day of -------------------- 19 .......
On the -.......... day of --------- 19 - ,at ------------ Texas - .............. ,
wife of ---------------- subscribed the foregoing instrument in our presence,
and we at her request and in her presence have signed below as witnesses
to her signature.
It is desirable to have the wife's separate acknowledgement attached. For other forms, see:
P-H Wills-Trusts-Estate Planning Forms 5 69,504; Frank Sbicca, 35 T.C. No. 14 (Octo-
ber 24, 1960); Pacific Nat'l Bank, 40 B.T.A. 128, 130 (1939); In re Rider's Estate, 199
Cal. 724, 251 Pac. 799, 801 (1926); Opp v. Frye, 70 Cal. App. 2d 478, 161 P.2d 235,
237 (1945); Security-First Nat'l Bank v. Stack, 32 Cal. App. 2d 586, 90 P.2d 337, 339
(1939); In re Wyss' Estate, 112 Cal. App. 487, 297 Pac. 100, 101 (1931); O'Neil v.
Ross, 98 Cal. App. 306, 277 Pac. 123, 126 (1929). See also Rice, Family Tax Planning,
ch. 23, § 8, at 1002 (1960).
3" See Westfall, supra note 321, at 1283.
"2 Pacific Nat'l Bank, 40 B.T.A. 128 (1939) (no transfer during the husband's life-
time, but only at his death).
127 The doctrine of election applies equally to either spouse, and in the usual course of
events, the husband predeceases the wife. Even if the wife should die first, it would rarely
be advantageous to present the husband with an election situation since the usual object of
the wife's will is to preserve control of the community property in the husband. This may
be accomplished by having the wife make a testamentary disposition of her community
interest to the husband as trustee. See Brawerman, How to Draft a Will with the Widow's
Election, 1956 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 359, 361; Brookes, The Tax Consequences of Widows'
Elections in Community Property States, 1951 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 83.
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I. ESTATE TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE WIDOW'S ELECTION AT
THE HUSBAND'S DEATH
A. Composition Of The Husband's Gross Estate
Chronologically, the first tax incurred by the use of a "widow's
election will" is the estate tax at the husband's death. The husband's
gross estate is comprised of all property to the extent of his interest
therein.32 Although all of the husband's separate property is in-
cluded in his gross estate, that part of the community property which
is included is only the one-half interest over which he possesses a
power of testamentary disposition."' The other one half of the com-
munity estate belongs to the wife and is not included in the hus-
band's gross estate, even though her interest is subject to the husband's
control during his lifetime. Although the theory of the estate tax
is to tax the husband's community interest and the wife's com-
munity interest on their respective deaths, a double tax is imposed
on the portion of the husband's estate which passes to the wife and,
remaining unexhausted at her subsequent death, is included in her
gross estate also."' This double tax may be avoided if the husband
creates a testamentary trust composed of the entire community estate,
with the wife as life beneficiary, remainder over to the children.
This is the typical "widow's election will" and it effectively avoids
the second tax.
B. Effect Of The Wife's Election
The fact that the husband's will presents the wife with an election
situation does not of itself cause her community interest to be in-
cluded in his gross estate since the husband owns no interest in her
property at his death and has no right to make a testamentary dis-
position thereof.3 ' Even if the wife actually elects under the hus-
38 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2033.
.. This was not always the case. Prior to the enactment of Int. Rev. Code of 1939,
5 811 (e)(2), added by ch. 619, 56 Stat. 798 (1942), there was no provision prescribing
the method of taxing a community property estate. Under Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §
811(a), however, the courts considered only one half of the value of the community
property to be includable in the estate of the first spouse to die. Section 811(e)(2) re-
quired the entire value of the community estate to be included in the estate of the first
decedent, with certain exceptions. The Revenue Act of 1948 restored the prior status
to the community property owners and the 1954 Code effects the same result.
.. Because the marital deduction provision specifically exempts community property
from the adjusted gross estate (from which 50 per cent of decedent's property can be
passed to a surviving spouse tax-free) Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056, there is no deduction
available to a decedent who transfers community property to a surviving spouse. Moreover,
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2013, allows a diminishing credit for prior taxes, based on the
number of years which has elapsed since the tax was paid. This credit does not fully com-
pensate the decedent for the loss incurred by having the property taxed in both estates,
however.
"
t Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2033.
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band's will, an early G.C.M."' ruled that her election does not increase
his gross estate by the value of her community interest. The result
is not changed when the husband creates a testamentary trust com-
posed of the entire community estate with the wife as the life
beneficiary, and the wife subsequently elects to adopt this testamen-
tary disposition in lieu of her community interest.333 Even if the
wife executes an inter vivos agreement contemporaneously with the
execution of the husband's will, his gross estate is not increased by
the value of the wife's community interest which she waived upon
her subsequent election under his will." 4 The basis for this holding
is that the wife's inter vivos election does not constitute a transfer
to, or a vesting of, any interest in the husband.3
It is arguable that the reason the wife's election to take under
the husband's will does not result in the inclusion of her community
interest in his gross estate is because the wife's freedom of action
during the husband's lifetime has not been restricted by her election."'
It is clear that an election by the wife after the husband's death
does not curtail her freedom of action in any way during the hus-
band's lifetime."' By her election after his death, the wife merely
allows her community interest to pass in the manner prescribed by
32 G.C.M. 7773, XI-2 Cum. Bull. 426 (1930). This ruling involved a situation where
the wife elected to take her legacy under the husband's will which purported to dispose
of the entire community in addition to his separate property. The property was devised
to the wife and her two children, share and share alike.
3
.Coffman-Dobson Bank & Trust Co., 20 B.T.A. 890 (1930), acq., X-1 Cum. Bull.
13 (1931) (Washington community property). The wife did not attempt to accomplish
a transfer of her community interest to the decedent's estate; further, such a transfer
cannot be accomplished under the community property laws by the mere election under
the will, without other formality. Her community interest under Washington law is sub-
ject to her power of testamentary disposition.
.. Pacific Nat'l Bank, 40 B.T.A. 128 (1939). This case also found that no outright
transfer by the wife to the husband was made since the transfer was limited by the con-
dition precedent that the husband predecease her. The court held that the wife made an
inter vivos gift in trust on the condition named.
... See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2033.
.. See Westfall, supra note 321, at 1274.
33 Professor Westfall also expresses the opinion that the husband's powers over the
wife's community interest are so extensive that some portion of her community interest
arguably should be included in the husband's gross estate under the provision relating to
general powers of appointment, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041. Such a contention is in
conflict with the theory of the community property system. The husband's power of man-
agement over the community exists only during the life of the community and not after its
dissolution. In a case involving a joint and mutual will, where the surviving wife received
a life estate in the entire community, remainder to the children, she did not acquire a
taxable power of appointment over the entire community. Kay v. Phinney, CCH 59-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 5 11,869 (W.D. Tex. April 20, 1959). On appeal it was determined that the
will gave the wife a general power of appointment, and thus the entire community estate
was included in her gross estate. Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1960). However,
a life estate in the entire community with remainder to the children, without more, does
not appear tantamount to a general power of appointment over the entire community. By
analogy, therefore, it is arguable that the husband's gross estate should not be taxed on
the value of a power of appointment over the wife's community interest.
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the husband's will and no grounds exist for the argument that the
wife has restricted her freedom of choice during the husband's life-
time."'s Whether the wife's freedom of choice is curtailed by her
inter vivos election, however, is not settled and this issue will probably
depend upon the effect of the agreement under local law. Assuming
that the wife's freedom of choice is restricted, the only argument
for including it in the husband's gross estate is that by virtue of
the inter vivos election the wife is deemed to have created a general
power of appointment in the husband over her community interest."s'
This argument is refuted because the wife's consent is necessary
before the power is effective; therefore, no part of the property is
includable in the husband's gross estate since it is exempt as being
a joint power, exercisable only with the concurrence of the creator."'
From a practical standpoint, the determination of whether the
wife's community interest is includable in the husband's gross estate
turns on the answer to another question, viz., did the wife transfer
some interest to the husband prior to his death? 4' Therefore, in
drafting an inter vivos election agreement, extreme care must be
taken to prevent any possible construction that the execution of the
agreement transfers any property interest to the husband during
his lifetime.
In Frank Sbicca,"4' the wife executed an inter vivos election agree-
ment.4 to take under the husband's will, which disposed of property
acquired in a common-law jurisdiction. Under California law44 the
wife has a mere expectancy in this property, similar to that in
pre-1927 community property. Since such an expectancy is a
marital right, 43 relinquishment thereof is not "consideration in
money or money's worth" under section 2043 (b) of the 1954
Code. Therefore, the entire value of the property is includable in
the husband's gross estate without a reduction for consideration and
without a reduction for the one half that is owned by the wife at
338 The wife is not subject to state inheritance taxes on her community interest although
she elects to take under the husband's will which purports to dispose of the entire com-
munity upon the theory that there is no transfer but only a partition of the community
property. State v. Jones, 5 S.W.2d 973 (Tex. Comm. App. 1928); see also Falknor,
Liability of the Entire Community Estate for the Payment of State Inheritance Tax Where
Husband Undertakes to Dispose of Entire Community Estate by Will and Wife Elects
to Take Under the Will, 5 Wash. L. Rev. 55 (1930).
339 See Westfall, supra note 321, at 1276.
..o Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041(b)(1)(C)(i).
341 See 1 Beveridge, Federal Estate Taxation § 5.08, at 188 (1956).
342 35 T.C. No. 14 (Oct. 24, 1960).
141 Similar to the agreement in note 324 supra.
14 Cal. Prob. Code § 201.5.




his death. This decision leaves the inference that the wife's surrender
of a vested community interest would be consideration for the
husband's testamentary transfer of his separate property, thereby
reducing his estate. This implication seems patently erroneous. The
consideration provisions of section 2043 apply only to inter vivos
transfers. There is no precedent for allowing the property that the
wife surrenders to act as consideration for the husband's testamen-
tary disposition, thereby reducing his gross estate.
C. Marital Deduction
The marital deduction may be of little consequence in the usual
community property estate plan since section 2056(c) (2) (B) of
the 1954 Code disqualifies community property from its application.
To the extent that the husband's estate consists of separate property,
however, the marital deduction is important. Although the marital
deduction provision does not specifically refer to the effect of a
widow's election, the Regulations under section 2056(e) indicate
that the husband's separate property may qualify for the marital
deduction even though the wife must elect with reference to it."'
Thus, the marital deduction is available if the husband's will pur-
ports to dispose of the wife's separate property in trust for the
children and devises his separate property to her in lieu thereof. If
the husband's will only devises a life estate to the wife, the marital
deduction is not available because of the terminable interest rule
of section 2056(b).
Although the husband's testamentary disposition of his separate
property under a widow's election will qualifies for the marital
deduction, a difficult problem of valuation is presented. Section
2056(b) (4) (B) provides that
where such interest or property is encumbered in any manner, or
where the surviving spouse incurs any obligation imposed by the
decedent with respect to the passing of such interest, such encum-
brance or obligation shall be taken into account in the same manner
as if the amount of a gift to such spouse of such interest were being
determined.
Obviously this provision needs interpretation since the terms "en-
cumbrance," "obligation," and "taken into account" are not suf-
ficiently precise. 4 ' The Regulations define the government's position
on the question of what constitutes an "encumbrance" or "obliga-
tion." Generally, property passing to the survivor (1) which is
.
4 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(c) (1958).
341 See 4 Mertens, Federal Gift and Estate Taxation § 29.53 (1959).
[Vol. 15
COMMENTS
subject to a mortgage, (2) which imposes an obligation on the
surviving spouse to satisfy some debt, or (3) which is in satisfaction
of a debt owing to the surviving spouse, constitutes an "en-
cumbrance" or "obligation" and must be deducted from the value
of the property otherwise qualifying for the marital deduction.34 s
In addition, however, the government contends that the value
of the separate property passing to the wife for purposes of the
marital deduction must be reduced by the value of the community
(or other property) interest which the wife must relinquish if she
elects under a widow's election will."9 In Stapf v. United States,"'
the husband purported to make a testamentary disposition of the
entire community and all of his separate property by devising
one third to the wife and two thirds in trust for the children. The
court rejected the government's contention and held that the will
did not impose "an obligation" on the wife within the meaning of
the statute. The election presented to the wife, viz., to accept one
third of the combined estates under the will (including the hus-
band's separate estate) or to retain her community interest at law,
was a mere option, and at most, a condition. The court held that a
pecuniary obligation annexed directly to the property is necessary
in order to constitute an "encumbrance." Example (3) of section
20.2056(b)-4(b) of the Regulations apparently was overturned by
implication as an erroneous overgrowth of exposition."3 '
Once the property is found to be "encumbered in any manner,"
the extent to which such encumbrance "shall be taken into account"
in determining the value of the interest passing to the surviving
spouse becomes paramount. Although the Stapf case apparently never
.
4 Treas. Reg. S 20.2056(b)-4(b) (1958).
348Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(b)-4(b) example (3) (1958) provides:
A decedent bequeathed certain securities to his wife in lieu of her interest
in property held by them as community property under the law of the
State of their residence. The wife elected to relinquish her community prop-
erty interest and to take the bequest. For the purpose of the marital deduc-
tion, the value of the bequest is to be reduced by the value of the community
property interest relinquished by the wife.
See a special ruling dated Nov. 21, 1956, reported in 1959 Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. 3
8102.
3 5 5CCH 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 11,967 (N.D. Tex. 1960).
.. The court points out that neither the statute, Int. Rev. Code of 1939, 5
812(e) (1) (E) (ii), added by ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110 (1948) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 2056(b) (4) (B)) on which example (3) is based, nor the committee report, S. Rep.
No. 1013, pt. 2, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948), makes any reference to community prop-
erty. The only contingencies which were recognized as being relevant to the value of the
property are enumerated in examples (1) and (2), and reflect an intent to guard against
a marital deduction based on an inflated valuation.
The strongest argument in support of the court's holding is that the real purpose of
the statute is to guard against the allowance of the marital deduction in a sum which is
greater than the net value of the property involved, e.g., when it is encumbered with a
mortgage or subject to an obligation of some kind.
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reached this question because the property was held to be un-
encumbered, some noteworthy observations were made on this point
in dictum. The court observed that the "taking into account" of
any encumbrance is to be done in the same manner as if the amount
of a gift to the surviving spouse of such interest were being determin-
ed. Apparently the court considers that this language refers to a
determination of value for gift tax purposes because the value is the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller under the Gift Tax Regulations."5' The
net value to the donee (wife) is held to be an extraneous factor
and the fact that she gives up more than she receives does not
properly affect the valuation of the transfer.353
Thus, the husband's separate property may qualify for the marital
deduction and also act as consideration for the wife's election under
the will if it is transferred to a marital deduction trust which meets
the statutory requirements and gives the wife a benefit in the form
of a life estate upon the relinquishment of her property."4 Two
352 Treas. Reg. 108, § 86.19(a) (1948) (now Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1); see 4 Mertens,
op. cit. supra note 347, § 2953.
" It is difficult to see how the wife has parted with anything of value by the trans-
fer of her property to a testamentary trust, especially if she retains full right to the in-
come, and her transfer of a remainder interest is subject to a reserved testamentary power
of appointment which causes the property to be taxed to her estate but does not subject it
to the gift tax. Rev. Rul. 54-342, 1954-2 Cum. Bull. 315; see Brown, The Widow's Elec-
tion as a Tax-Saving Device, 96 Trusts & Estates 30, 31 (1957); Nossaman, Trusts Under
the Revenue Act of 1948, 1950 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 459, 472 (a criticism of the transfer,
showing why it might not be an election in all events).
In the Stapf case, the transfer is analogized to an inter vivos gift by the husband
to the wife of his one-third interest in the whole estate, both separate and community,
subject to the understanding that the wife would then give her community interest to a
trust for the children's benefit. It was reasoned that since this would be a taxable gift under
Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945), although the husband's inter vivos gift
is less than what the wife transferred in trust for the children's benefit, under the willing
seller-willing buyer test it sells for no more or no less because of the value of the com-
munity interest that the wife relinquishes. The gift of one third of the separate property
and the devise of the one third of the separate property are similar. Thus, the estate tax
liability is not canceled simply because the gift has no net value to the donee. Although
the purpose of the marital deduction is to provide a respite in taxation until the wife's
subsequent death, property given by the husband to the wife under the present facts is
taxed in both estates. It is taxed to the husband's estate, and being a valuable right, it is
also taxed to the wife's estate.
... It would seem advisable to create a separate trust, over which the wife has a power of
appointment, for the reception of the husband's separate property that qualifies for the mari-
tal deduction. To avoid an estate tax at the wife's subsequent death, the trust may provide
the wife with an unlimited power to invade the corpus, thereby permitting her to exhaust
the property in the "marital deduction trust" prior to her death. An unlimited power to
invade corpus is the equivalent of a power to appoint the corpus to herself. Treas. Reg.
S 20.2056(b)-5(g)(i) (1958). This method allows the husband's gross estate to deduct
the property by virtue of the marital deduction. At the wife's subsequent death, this
property interest is excluded from her gross estate to the extent that she has exhausted it.
See Brookes, supra note 327, at 108.
If the wife retains a power over the property she relinquishes upon her election,
she is deemed to have made an incomplete gift. Although there is no gift tax at the time
of her election, this property is included in her estate upon her subsequent death without
COMMENTS
observations seem relevant with reference to the result reached by
the Stapf case. First, on the basis of policy, it seems that the re-
quirements for the marital deduction are intended to be strictly con-
strued to limit the available deduction. Therefore, the language
"tencumbered in any manner" would apparently disqualify an interest
that passes to the wife only upon her election under the will.
Logically, such language could encompass a condition or even an
option, which the Stapf case construed a widow's election to be.
Nevertheless, the Tax Court had previously rejected the Commis-
sioner's contention that the phrase "in any manner" disqualifies all
encumbered property without exception."' Consequently, the widow's
election may be an encumbrance, but not of a character which dis-
qualifies the property from the benefits of the marital deduction.
The second observation is that the failure to reduce the value of
the property passing to the wife for purposes of the marital deduction
under the holding of the Stapf case may prevent property that the
wife relinquishes upon her election from qualifying as "insufficient
consideration" which reduces her gift tax under section 2 5 12 (b) or
her estate tax under section 2043. Since neither of these sections
refers to a determination of the value by taking an encumbrance into
account under the principles used to determine the value for gift tax
purposes, the holding of the Stapf case should not prevent a "net-
ting" of what the wife relinquishes against what the husband devises
under a widow's election will. If a "netting" of the two property
interests was not intended by Congress, the statute should be
amended.
D. Charitable Contributions
Another possible deduction which the husband's estate may claim
is the charitable deduction. This deduction is limited to "the value
of the transferred property required to be included in the gross
estate."'' .Suppose the husband attempts to devise the entire com-
munity estate to a testamentary trust which provides the wife with
a life estate in the corpus, remainder over to charity. May the
husband's estate claim a deduction for the full value of the re-
mainder in both halves of the community upon the wife's election
under the will?". As the wife's election does not require the inclusion
of her community interest in the husband's gross estate, any deduc-
reduction for any consideration which may have been received, viz., the life estate in
her husband's property. Lela Barry Vardell, 35 T.C. No. 8 (Oct. 17, 1960).
.. D. Byrd Gwinn, 25 T.C. 31, 40 (1955); see Mertens, op. cit. supra note 347
29.53, at 605; Casner, Estate Planning 655 n.44 (2d ed. 1956, Supp. 1960).
"..Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2055(d).
" Westfall, supra note 321, at 1274.
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tion would be limited to the value of the remainder in the husband's
community interest. The reason is that the remainder in his com-
munity one half would be all that is required to be included in his
gross estate."'
E. joint Wills
The similarity between joint wills and the widow's election will
seems sufficiently great to strengthen the argument that the wife's
interest is not taxed to the husband's estate upon her election under
his will. For example, if the husband and wife make a joint will
devising all of the community property to a trust upon the death
of the first spouse, income payable therefrom to the survivor for
life, remainder vested in another, only one half of the corpus is
included in the gross estate of the first decedent."' Thus, if the
husband dies first, his estate would not be taxed with the wife's
community interest because her community interest is not transferred
to his gross estate by executing a joint will. Furthermore, the use
of a joint will should not be considered a waiver of the wife's com-
munity rights resulting in the inclusion of the value of her com-
munity interest in the husband's gross estate. "'
II. GIFT TAX CONSEQUENCES OF THE WIDOW'S ELECTION.
The widow's election will gives rise to several gift tax questions.
First, if a widow renounces the benefits of the will and elects to
take her community interest, does she make a taxable gift of the
rejected legacy to the other beneficiaries of the will? Second, if she
elects to take under the will, does she make a taxable gift of the
property interest which she relinquishes by virtue of her election?
Third, if there is a taxable gift by her election under the will, at
what value is the gift taxed? Finally, how may the gift tax problem
be eliminated and the widow's election will still be used?
At the outset it should be noted that the gift tax applies to any
transfer by way of gift whether the transfer is in trust or otherwise,
whether the gift is direct or indirect, and whether the property is real
.. In an analogous case, McFarland v. Campbell, 213 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1954), the
parties by an irrevocable joint will provided for a life estate to the wife in the husband's
community one half. Upon the death of the survivor all of the property was to go to
charity. The court disallowed the full deduction because nothing passed to charity from
the wife's estate during her lifetime, although she was bound by the terms of the joint
will upon the husband's death.
s"See McFarland v. Campbell, supra note 358; Scofield v. Bethea, 170 F.2d 934 (5th
Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 944 (1949); Commissioner v. Masterson, 127 F.2d 252
(5th Cir. 1942) (This case shows the perils of using a joint will.); see generally Casner,
op. cit. supra note 355, at 53 n.19.
.. I Beveridge, op. cit. supra note 341, at 187-88.
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or personal, tangible or intangible. " ' Thus, all transactions whereby
property, property rights, or interests are gratuitously passed to or
conferred upon another, regardless of the means or device employed,
constitute gifts subject to the tax. 6' Absence of donative intent
does not of itself exempt a transfer from the operation of the gift
statute.313 Moreover, the application of the gift tax is not confined
to the common-law concept of gifts, i.e., transfers made without a
valuable consideration, but rather it embraces sales, exchanges, and
other dispositions of property for a consideration to the extent that
the value of the property transferred by the donor exceeds the value
in money or money's worth of the consideration given therefor.""
A. The Wife's Renunciation As A Taxable Gift
The wife's renunciation of the property under the husband's will
(or the laws of descent and distribution) may be deemed a taxable
gift to the other beneficiaries whose portion is increased thereby (or
to the heirs at law who receive a larger share of the intestate's
property). Generally, a distinction is made between renunciation
under the will and renunciation under the laws of descent and
distribution. In the former, the wife's renunciation is not a taxable
gift since she is free either to accept or to reject the benefits of the
will."' If the decedent dies intestate, renunciation is considered a
gift to the extent of the renounced property because an heir may
not prevent title from vesting by renouncing his share."' In Texas,
however, the distinction between the two situations apparently does
not exist. The Texas statute.. provides that devises under a will
shall vest title in the devisee immediately upon the testator's death.
In Rodgers v. United States,36' an attempted renunciation of a
testamentary disposition was held to result in a taxable gift even
though the will was never admitted to probate. Under such a statute
it seems advisable to avoid renunciation in either situation unless
one is willing to run the risk of making a taxable gift.
B. The Wife's Election Under The Will As A Taxable Gift
Since it has been held that an irrevocable transfer of a remainder
"..Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2511(a); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(a) (1958).
'"Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(c) (1958).
"'.Treas. Reg. 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1958).
... Treas. Reg. 5 25.2512-8 (1958); see Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512(b).
"' William L. Maxwell, 17 T.C. 1589 (1952); cf. Brown v. Routzahn, 63 F.2d 914
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 641 (1933).
'Hardenbergh v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 63 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 836
(1952); Frances Marcus, 22 T.C. 824 (1954), acq., 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 5.
".. Tex. Prob. Code Ann. 5 37.
36' 2 1 8 F.2d 760 (5th Cir 1955).
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interest to a trust is a taxable gift,369 once the wife is deemed to have
transferred her remainder interest in the community to the husband's
testamentary trust by her election under the will, it logically follows
that she has made a taxable gift. The two cases"s'a in which a court
has faced the question of whether the wife's election under a widow's
election will is a gift are Chase Nat'l Bank'. and Commissioner v.
Siegel.'' In Chase Nat'l Bank, the taxpayer contended that the wife
had no donative intent and merely exchanged her community prop-
erty rights for a life interest in a much larger principal, a transaction
deemed to her economic advantage. In the Siegel case, the taxpayer
made the same contention but also argued that in any event she
received "adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth" for the remainder interest which was transferred to the
husband's testamentary trust as a result of her election. Thus, it was
argued that the value of the remainder interest in the wife's com-
munity one half was not subject to the gift tax. Both the Tax Court
and the court of appeals held that because the terms of the gift tax
statute are to be construed in their broadest and most comprehensive
sense, the wife makes a gift by electing to take under the husband's
will. Exemption from the gift tax statute occurs only when an arm's
length bargaining situation exists without a showing of donative
intent, i.e., when one party simply makes a better bargain."" In these
cases no arm's length relationship existed between persons bargain-
ing one with the other in the ordinary course of business.' Thus,
the transactions were not exempt from the gift tax under the "busi-
ness transfer exception,'. but were subject to the gift tax which
is imposed on transfers for "less than an adequate and full con-
sideration in money or money's worth."''
C. Valuation Of The Gift
Once the wife is deemed to make a taxable gift by electing to
take the benefits under the husband's will in lieu of her community
property rights, the principal problem is one of valuation of the gift.
'. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176 (1943).
"'
5
a A third case, Zillah Mae Turman, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 24,721 (M) (March
20, 1961), was decided too recently to be included in the text. The Tax Court followed
the Siegel case and the opinion of the Tax Court in the Chase case.
37025 T.C. 617 (1955), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. Commissioner v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959) (The
court of appeals held that the wife was not presented with an election by the terms of
the husband's will).
37'250 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1957).
'
7
'Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
... Cf. Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184 (1943).
a Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 747-49 (1956).
'7'Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512(b); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
[Vol. 1 $
COMMENTS
Section 2512(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides
that the value at the date of the gift is to be considered the amount
of the gift. Section 2512 (b) reads as follows:
Where property is transferred for less than an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount by which
the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall
be deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the amount of
gifts made during the calendar year.
The Regulations under this section provide that a sale or transfer in
the ordinary course of business (a bona fide, arm's length trans-
action without donative intent) is considered made for an adequate
and full consideration."' Relinquishment of dower or curtesy, or
statutory estates created in lieu of dower or curtesy, or other marital
rights in the spouse's property is not deemed consideration in money
or money's worth to any extent."'
The problem of valuation of the gift is further compounded by
the question of whether the value of the wife's gift to the testa-
mentary trust, viz., the remainder in her community interest, may
be reduced by the value of a life estate in the husband's community
one half which she receives by her election to take under his will.""
For years the language in Robinette v. Helvering5 and Giannini
v. Commissioner.. was thought to preclude a life estate in the hus-
band's community interest from being consideration which would
reduce the value of the wife's gift of her remainder. In the Robinette
case, however, the taxpayer contended that she made no gift be-
cause the transfer of a remainder interest to an inter vivos trust
was supported by "full consideration in money or money's worth,"
viz., an agreement to execute identical trusts concerning the dis-
position of property rather than the value of the property itself
which was received in exchange therefor."' The Supreme Court
held. that (1) the agreement is not adequate and full considera-
3
.Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958).
377 See ibid.; Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945); Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324
U.S. 303 (1945) (Community property is not included in this statutory prohibition since
it is an actual property right and is not created in lieu of common-law marital rights).
378 See 5 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 347, § 34.28.
379318 U.S. 184 (1943).
380 148 F.2d 285 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 730 (1945).
"' A daughter, contemplating marriage, created an inter vivos trust with successive
life estates first to herself, then to her parents, with remainder to her issue. The parents
created a similar trust with successive life estates first to themselves, then to the daughter,
with remainder to the daughter's issue. The purpose of this transaction was to keep the
daughter's fortune in the family. The Commissioner contended that the parents made a
taxable gift of the remainder to the daughter's issue. The taxpayer contended that the
agreement between the parties to create the trusts was sufficient consideration to exempt
the remainder from the gift tax statute.
8s2318 U.S. at 188.
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tion for the transfer since it is not subject to valuation for gift
tax purposes, and (2) this is not a transaction "in the ordinary
course of business" which would be deemed made for an "adequate
and full consideration in money or money's worth." Hence, the
transaction is subject to the gift tax. Although the Supreme Court
in the Robinette case held that a transfer of a remainder is subject
to the gift tax because it is not in the ordinary course of business,
this holding does not preclude the argument that the transfer is
reduced by any consideration received. This possibility is not
mentioned by the Supreme Court. In the Giannini case, which in-
volved an estate tax question, the court of appeals found that a
transaction similar to that in the Robinette case is not exempt
from the estate tax under the "business transfer exception."3 83 The
court, however, went beyond the Robinette case by holding that
what is now section 2043'" is inapplicable because the transfer
to the trust, if a gift, cannot also be an exchange for an insufficient
consideration.
The reasoning of the Giannini case appears erroneous and is ap-
parently overruled sub silentio by Commissioner v. Siegel and Chase
Nat'l Bank. These two cases held that a wife's election to accept a
life estate in the entire community under her husband's will is
a taxable gift to the extent that the value of her remainder interest
in the community, which she relinquishes to the testamentary trust,
exceeds the value of the life estate in the husband's community in-
terest, which she receives under the will~asa In other words, a tax-
able gift is effected by the wife's election under the will, but the value
of the gift for tax purposes is equal to the value of the property
... Here, a family trust was created to which each of the three children contributed
ten per cent of the corpus and the parents contributed the remainder. The net income
was divided equally among the three children for their lives with the remainder going
to their nominee. The Commissioner contended, and the court held, that at the death
of one of the children the value of his ten per cent contribution should be included in his
estate for estate tax purposes because he had retained a life estate therein.
384Formerly, Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 302(i), 44 Stat. 71 (now Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 2043 (a)) which reads as follows:
If any one of the transfers, trusts, interests, rights, or powers enumerated
and described in sections 2035 to 2038, inclusive, and section 2041 is made,
created, exercised, or relinquished for a consideration in money or money's
worth, but is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth, there shall be included in the gross estate only the
excess of the fair market value at the time of death of the property otherwise
to be included on account of such transaction, over the value of the con-
sideration received therefor by the decedent.
",a In Zillah Mae Turman, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 24,721 (M) (March 20, 1961),
the taxpayer's argument that the value of a life estate in the entire community should be
the consideration for her election, thereby reducing the value of her gift of the remainder,
was rejected, The Tax Court found no reason to deviate from the rule in the Chase and
Seigel cases,
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which the electing spouse relinquishes, reduced by the value of the
consideration received under the will."8' Both the Tax Court and
the court of appeals refuted the taxpayer's contention that the
trustee's discretionary power to distribute principal should further
reduce the value of the taxable gift. The court reasoned that this
power is incapable of valuation because it gives the widow a mere
possibility of receiving a distribution. "' The theory of the Chase
and Siegel cases seems to be that the wife makes a partly gratuitous
exchange of her community interest for an advantageous life estate
by electing under the husband's will." 7 This theory seems consistent
with the spirit and purpose of section 2512 (b).
The effect of the Chase and Siegel cases, viz., a reduction of the
amount of the taxable gift by the value of the property that the
donor receives as consideration from a third party in the same trans-
action, has been criticized as an illogical solution to a question which
is basic to the application of the gift tax. " The reasoning behind
this criticism is that if the gift tax is applicable at all, the entire value
of the gift should be taxed without a reduction for property that
the donor receives as consideration from a third party in the same
transaction; or the transaction should escape the gift tax completely.
Moreover, it is argued that if the wife elects to acquiesce in the
husband's testamentary disposition of the remainder in her com-
munity interest as the price of receiving a life estate in his com-
munity one half, without regard to the remainderman's identity,
the gift tax should be wholly inapplicable. "' The theory is that the
wife merely appraises the respective values of the life estate in the
husband's community interest and the remainder in her community
one half and concludes that the former is more valuable to her than
the latter. In other words, she is motivated solely by "economic self-
interest" ' and a donative intent is entirely lacking.
... Provision should be made for payment of gift taxes by the trust since, in the
normal case, the wife has no assets after her election out of which the gift tax can be paid.
38. But cf. Commissioner v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958) (transfer
to trust, reserving a life estate and power to distribute principal to donor in the sole dis-
cretion of the trustee held not to be a taxable gift because there was no assurance that
anything would pass to the remaindermen).
.87 See Westfall, Estate Planning and the Widow's Election, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1269
(1958). Although the property that the wife relinquishes does not reduce the value of the
property passing from the husband for purposes of the marital deduction under the
"encumbrance" test, see text at note 351 supra, the property passing from the husband to
the wife is still deemed consideration under section 2512(b), which reduces the gift tax.
In Stapf v. United States, CCH 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 5 11,967 (N.D. Tex. 1960), it was
assumed that a gift tax was due upon the wife's election in an amount equal to the
excess of the value of her relinquished community interest over the one third of the total
estate devised by the will.
388 See Westfall, supra note 387, at 1277-78.
38 Id. at 1278.
.8. Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra note 374, at 747-49; see also Comment, Tax
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As previously indicated a gift tax is imposed on transfers made
without donative intent,"'l but transfers made "for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth" are exempt from the
gift tax. Therefore, if the wife's bad business bargains are to escape
the gift tax, her conclusion as to the relative values of the life estate
and remainder interest, when motivated solely by economic self-
interest, should be accepted in preference over values set forth in
actuarial tables which do not reflect her state of health or possible
preference for an assured life income. If the wife's conclusion
as to the value of respective property interests is accepted, the
transfer would be exempt from the gift tax because it is made
for "an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth." 2 If the remaindermen are her children, however, as opposed
to strangers to whom she has no desire to pass her property at death,
it will be doubtful whether she is motivated solely by economic self-
interest.
Another possible exclusion from the gift tax was abrogated by the
holding in the Robinette case, viz., that a transfer motivated by a
"desire to pass the family fortune on to others" can hardly be in
the "ordinary course of business" which exempts the transfer from
the gift tax. Furthermore, a transfer motivated by such a desire
could not also be motivated solely by the donor's economic self-
interest. In conclusion, (1) because it is doubtful that a widow's
election is motivated solely by the wife's economic self-interest
when the remaindermen are her children, and (2) because a transfer
by virtue of the widow's election is not made "in the ordinary course
of business" if it is motivated by the desire to preserve the family
fortune, and (3) if the basic proposition is correct, viz., that either
the gift tax is applicable or wholly inapplicable to the entire value
of the gift without a reduction for property the donor receives from
a third person in the same transaction, the gift tax should be imposed
on the full amount of the remainder which is transferred by the
wife's election under the will.
In support of the holding in the Chase and Siegel cases, it may be
argued that when the transferee-remainderman is a natural object of
the couple's bounty, a partially false appearance of consideration is
better than an inquiry into the wife's subjective intent, of which even
Aspects of Widow's Election, 1 Ariz. L. Rev. 105, 109 (1959). The business transfer
exception is applied to transfers unconnected with a business where the transferee's sole
motive was economic betterment. For the origin of the term economic self-interest see note
321 supra.
3 5 tTreas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(1) (1958).
aaCf. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2512(b).
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she may not be sure, to determine if she is motivated solely by
economic self-interest."' Clearly, imposition of the gift tax on the
full amount of the transfer upon the wife's election to take under
the will is not desirable when, in reality, her election may be sup-
ported by consideration. Stubborn adherence to an arbitrary rule
that all inter-family transfers are without consideration because they
are not motivated by economic self-interest will surely result in
inequities. If the transfer resulting from the wife's election under the
will is motivated solely by economic self-interest or is "in the ordinary
course of business," complete exclusion from the gift tax may be
more desirable from the taxpayer's viewpoint. The revenue may be
better protected, however, by striking a median between the two
extremes of complete exclusion from, and immutable subjection to,
the gift tax. This compromise would consider the actuarial values
of the property transferred to the wife as consideration for her
election regardless of her motive. In other words, although some
property escapes the gift tax, viz., an amount equal to the value of
the property received by the widow as consideration for making an
election when she is motivated solely by a donative intent, it will
be partially recovered by a gift tax on the transfer resulting from
the election by a widow who is motivated solely by economic self-
interest and which might have been excluded from the gift tax. Any
inquiries into the difficult question of subjective intent will be
averted. In order to have the tax follow the economic realities, how-
ever, the application of the tax should be governed by the wife's
intent.
The decisions of Chase and Siegel may seem correct when the wife
is required to elect either the benefits under the will or her com-
munity interest. The argument for reducing the value of her gift
by the value of a life estate in the husband's community interest, as
the consideration which she receives, is considerably weakened if the
will allows her to receive benefits from his community interest even
if she also claims her community rights at law."" In drafting a
39 See Comment, supra note 390, at 109-10. In many cases the wife's motives may
not be at either extreme of the spectrum of taxable intent, but rather somewhere in be-
tween, thus incapable of determination even by herself. In the Chase case, the court stated
that the value of the remainder which was transferred to the inter vivos trust was not
reduced for gift tax purposes by the life estate in the husband's community interest. This
result may be distinguished from the election situation arising upon the husband's death.
In the former case, both parties are living and capable of bargaining at arm's length with
each other for benefits. In the normal election situation, however, one party is deceased
and therefore it is only the survivor who is faced with the decision as to which choice
will be to his or her economic betterment.
... See Weingarten, Gift and Estate Tax Consequences of Widow's Election in Com-
munity Property States, 42 A.B.A.J. 1163 (1956). If the wife repudiates the will, she
destroys her right in a trust created for purposes of the marital deduction. This result
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widow's election will the wife must be prohibited from receiving
both the benefits under the will and her property rights at law.
When the husband has separate property which is included in
the testamentary trust, in addition to his community interest, the
value of the remainder relinquished by the wife is probably less than
the value of that which she receives under the will. Therefore, it
follows that the wife has not made a taxable gift. The same result
occurs if the widow is very young because the values of remainder
interests and life interests are determined by actuarial tables."' When
the actuarial value of the life estate is fifty per cent or more of the
total value of the community one half, no gift tax results from the
wife's election to take under the will.
D. How To Avoid The Gift Tax Problem
Aside from merely diminishing the gift tax liability by reducing
the amount of the gift by the amount of consideration received, the
gift tax problem may be entirely avoided by careful drafting of the
will. For example, the gift tax is avoided when the transfer results
in an incomplete gift... or when the wife retains a power of appoint-
ment over her community interest. " ' This power may be exercisable
in favor of her descendants and only at her death."" Although use
of the foregoing suggestions may avoid the gift tax, that part of
the wife's community interest which escapes the gift tax and which
remains unexhausted at her death is subject to the estate tax."'
Moreover, the part of the wife's community which remains un-
can be prevented by giving the remaining benefits under the will to the wife regardless
of her election. Nossaman, supra note 353, at 472. By doing this, however, the argument
for holding the life estate in the husband's community one half as consideration is weak-
ened.
... Example: Suppose there is a community estate of $200,000 which the husband
attempts to place in his testamentary trust. What is the wife's gift tax liability when she
elects to take under her husband's will that devises her a life estate in the entire community
in lieu of the property rights which she surrenders?
Wage55 Wage50 Wage55*
Value of wife's community interest transferred to trust $100,000 $100,000 $100,000"
Less: value of reserved life estate to wife 45,926 51,970 45,926
Value of wife's gift to husband's testamentary trust 54,074 48,030 54,074
Less: value of life estate in husband's community interest 45,926 51,970 91,852*
Taxable gift 8,148 -0- -0-
*Assume further that the husband also created a life estate in $100,000 of his separate
property for the wife as consideration for the relinquishment of the remainder in her
community interest.
.. A gift in trust is not incomplete merely because the trustee is authorized to use the
trust income and corpus for the donor's support. Rev. Rul. 54-538, 1954-2 Cum. Bull.
316; but cf. Commissioner v. Vander Weele, 254 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1958).
..
7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2511.
... Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(b) (1958).
. oInt. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041; see Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
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exhausted at her death and is included in her estate may not be
reduced by the value of the life estate in the husband's community
interest which was consideration for the election, if the gift is in-
complete.""0 Because of this subsequent estate tax, it may be desirable
for the husband to create two trusts, one composed entirely of his
community interest and the other composed entirely of the wife's
community interest. The wife could retain a testamentary power of
appointment over that trust which contains her community interest.
Under this plan, the wife does not make a taxable gift upon her
election. To insure that the wife has not made a gift by her election,
all inheritance, succession, and federal estate taxes should be charged
to the trust composed of the husband's community interest."0 ' More-
over, by using this plan the wife's income tax may be minimized
by splitting the income between the two trusts. If, in addition, the
wife must exhaust the principal of the trust containing her com-
munity interest before she is entitled to any right of support from
the trust containing the husband's community interest, her estate
tax will be correspondingly reduced to the extent that she exhausts
her estate. Obviously, exhausting the principal of the trust contain-
ing the wife's community interest first reduces that trust's earning
power and this may not be desirable. The marital deduction, how-
ever, may be utilized by creating one of the trusts in conformity
with the requirements necessary to qualify for the deduction when
the husband's separate property is involved.
III. INCOME TAX CONSEQUENCES OF A WIDOW'S ELECTION WILL
Although it has never been so held, a wife conceivably could be
subject to income tax liability upon her election to take under a
widow's election will. By electing, the wife may realize a taxable
gain on the heretofore unrealized appreciation of her remainder
interest by relinquishing it in exchange for a life estate in the hus-
band's community interest. Such a situation is an exchange for an
adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth or one
deemed to be for an adequate and full consideration in money or
money's worth. Another potential problem is how to split the sub-
sequently earned trust income between the wife and the husband's
estate to obtain the most advantageous tax results.
400Lela Barry Vardell, 35 T.C. No. 8 (Oct. 17, 1960); see generally section IV
at p. 156, infra.
401 See Brown, supra note 353, at 31; Brawerman, How to Draft a Will with the
Widow's Election, 1956 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 359, 366.
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A. Possible Gain Recognized Upon The Wife's Election
To the extent that a transfer is made for a consideration in money
or money's worth, as in the Chase and Siegel cases, it is exempt from
the gift tax. A transfer for consideration, however, may be subjected
to the operation of the income tax statutes to the extent that the
appreciation in value of the remainder interest which the wife
relinquishes is unrealized. The theory is that the wife has purchased
a life estate with her remainder interest by her election under the
husband's will. It is possible, however, that the wife's election is not
a sale or exchange unless she is held to have purchased a present
income interest in the husband's estate by relinquishing the remainder
interest in her community one half."' If a sale or exchange does
exist, the gain recognized from the transaction should be taxed at
capital gains rates. Furthermore, the wife should be allowed an
amortization deduction with reference to the life estate in the hus-
band's community interest in order to recover her cost in the event
that a gain is recognized. '
B. How To Measure The Gain
Assuming that the wife's election is a taxable exchange of the
remainder in her community interest for the life estate in the hus-
band's community interest, a possible measure of the "realized" gain
has been said to be "the difference between that part of [the wife's]
basis for the remainder in her one half allocable in actuarial terms
to a remainder following her life estate, and the fair market value of
a life estate in [the husband's] one half, likewise determined actuari-
ally.4 . 4 This statement may be illustrated by the following two
examples, assuming that the total community estate is $200,000
($100,000 for the husband and $100,000 for the wife). (1) If the
402 See generally Brookes, 'The Tax Consequences of Widows' Elections in Community
Property States, 1951 So. Calif. Tax Inst. 83, 90. Thus far, it has never been held that
the wife realizes a taxable gain upon her election to take under her husband's will in
exchange for relinquishing the remainder interest in her community one half devised to
other beneficiaries under the husband's will. See also Ferguson v. Dickson, 300 Fed. 961
(3d Cir.), cert denied, 266 U.S. 628 (1924), where it was held that the wife's release
of her dower rights in the husband's property constitutes a sale.
403 See Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954); William N. Fry, 31 T.C. 522
(1958), non-acq., 1960-2 I.R.B. 7, aff'd, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9738 (6th Cir. Oct. 18,
1960).
.. Westfall, supra note 387, at 1282. This result appears consistent with the holding
of Reginald Fincke, 39 B.T.A. 510 (1939), acq., 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 12. There the tax-
payer transferred property in trust for his children, charging the trust with an amount
equal to his cost although the market value of the property was considerably greater. It
was held that the taxpayer realized no profit on the transaction. The transaction was a
sale for cost, plus a gift of the excess. See also ALI Fed. Income, Estate & Gift Tax Stat.
116-22 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1955); I.T. 3335, 1939-2 Cum. Bull. 193, revoking I.T.
2681, XII-1 Cum. Bull. 93.
[Vol. 1is
COMMENTS
actuarial value of the wife's life estate in the husband's community
interest at the time of the husband's death is $60,000 (remainder
$40,000) and the basis in the life estate and remainder are $30,000
and $20,000 respectively, the taxable gain to the wife upon her
election under the husband's will is $40,000, which is an amount
equal to the difference between the actuarial value of the life estate
in the husband's community interest and the basis in the wife's
community interest which is allocable to the remainder therein
($60,000 - $20,000 = $40,000). (2) If, however, the actuarial value
of the wife's life estate in the husband's community interest at the
time of the husband's death is $40,000 (remainder $60,000) and
the basis of the life estate and remainder are $20,000 and $30,000
respectively, the taxable gain to the wife upon her election to take
under the will is $10,000, which is an amount equal to the difference
between the actuarial value of the life estate in the husband's com-
munity interest and the basis in the wife's community interest which
is allocable to the remainder therein ($40,000 - $30,000 = $10,000).
As pointed out in the Chase and Siegel cases, the gift tax is applic-
able to the extent that the present value of the remainder, determin-
ed actuarially, which the wife is deemed to surrender by her act of
election under the husband's will, exceeds the value of a life estate
in the husband's community interest which she receives under his
will in exchange therefor. Thus, in example (2) above, a gift tax is
payable (in addition to the income tax) on $20,000, which is the
excess of the present value of the wife's remainder interest over
the life estate in the husband's community one half ($60,000 -
$40,000 = $20,000). Therefore, the total amount subject to taxation
is $30,000 ($10,000 income tax± $20,000 gift tax). In example
(1), however, since the present value of the remainder which the
wife relinquishes does not exceed the value of the life estate in the
husband's community one half which she receives in exchange there-
for, the wife is not deemed to have made a taxable gift. Therefore,
the total amount subject to taxation is $40,000, which is an amount
equal to the value of the heretofore unrealized appreciation in the
wife's remainder interest. If the Chase and Siegel cases are correct
in holding that the wife makes a taxable gift by electing under a
widow's election will whenever the present value of the remainder
she surrenders exceeds the value of the life estate she receives, as in
example (2), then it logically follows that when the value of the
life estate the wife receives exceeds the present value of the remainder
she surrenders, as in example (1), the excess should be held a bequest
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or devise to the wife and exempt from the income tax."' At any
rate, the situation presented in example (1) is rare and would
normally occur only in two instances. First, if the wife is not over
fifty years of age at her husband's death, the value of the life estate
in the husband's community interest will be greater than the re-
mainder she surrenders. Second, if the husband gives part of his
separate property to the wife as a benefit to induce her election
under his will, the life estate in his separate property, coupled with
the life estate in his community interest may make the benefit under
his will greater than the remainder she surrenders by her election
under his will.
In a community property jurisdiction, however, the unrealized
appreciation in the wife's remainder interest escapes the income tax
upon her election under a widow's election will because of the
operation of section 1014(b) (6) which gives the surviving spouse's
community interest a "stepped-up" basis equal to the fair market
value of the decedent's community interest at the time of his death. °'
Thus, although a gain may be realized by the wife upon her election,
it is not recognized. The proposed method of measuring the taxable
gain upon the wife's election is nullified when community property
is involved, yet it is of great importance if the wife elects to relin-
quish her separate property in exchange for a gift of the husband's
separate property."7 Cognizance of this possible measure of gain is
also of importance in a common-law jurisdiction when the wife
405Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102 (a).
4
""Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b)(6).
407 Assume that the husband's will creates a testamentary trust consisting of his sep-
arate property, having a fair market value of $100,000 at his death, and the wife's sep-
arate property, which also has a fair market value of $100,000 at his death. Assume
further that the terms of the trust provide the wife with a life estate in the corpus and
remainder to the children upon her death, provided that she elects to accept the benefits
under the will. Assume further that the actuarial values of the life estates in the respec-
tive properties to the wife, and the wife's adjusted basis in the properties are as follows:
Wife's Husband's
separate property separate property
Value at the husband's death $100,000 $100,000
Actuarial value of life estate to wife 50,000 50,000
Actuarial value of remainder 50,000 50,000
Wife's adjusted basis 50,000
Wife's adjusted basis allocable to life estate 25,000
Wife's adjusted basis allocable to remainder 25,000
Under these facts the wife incurs no gift tax liability because the value of the remainder
she is deemed to have surrendered is equal to the value of the life estate she receives in
exchange therefor. For income tax purposes, however, a gain may be recognized in the
amount of $25,000, i.e., the wife receives a life estate in the husband's separate property
(valued at $50,000) in exchange for the remainder in her separate property (valued at
$25,000). If the exchange is of property of like kind, which is used in the trade or busi-
ness or held for investment, no gain is recognized. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1031. Securi-
ties and other property which are not held for investment or in the trade or business do
not qualify for the non-recognition provisions.
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relinquishes her property rights in exchange for benefits under the
husband's will.
C. Splitting The Subsequently Earned Income
If the community estate is large, provisions should be made so
that the wife is taxed only on the income from her community
interest after her election under the will. Placing the husband's
community interest in one testamentary trust (hereinafter referred
to as trust H) and the wife's interest in another testamentary trust
(hereinafter referred to as trust W) may accomplish this purpose.
In general, trust H should provide for the accumulation of income
during the wife's lifetime with distribution of corpus and accumulat-
ed income to her children upon her death. Trust W should provide
for a current distribution of all income to the wife during her life-
time with a general testamentary power of appointment to avoid
the gift tax upon her election. Under this procedure the wife is taxed
on no more income than if she had not elected under the will. For
the wife to be given the requisite benefit to present an election situa-
tion, she should receive the equivalent of a life estate in the entire
community when she elects to take under the husband's will. In
order to provide the wife with the equivalent of a life estate in the
entire community, the trustee of trust W should be directed to
distribute to the wife, in addition to the current income, an amount
of the corpus of the trust which is equal to the estimated annual
income of trust H, after payment of taxes. The trustee of trust H
should be empowered to loan trust W the equivalent of its net income
for each year and the trustee of trust W should be authorized to
borrow indiscriminately from trust H to obtain funds for the pay-
ments which are to be made out of corpus. " At the wife's death,
her estate is reduced by the amount of indebtedness to trust H.
Although these two trusts may be attacked as a method of evading
taxes, no provision of the Internal Revenue Code enables the Com-
missioner to change the effect of the two trusts if an honest indebted-
ness exists between themY1sa
Instead of borrowing from trust H to acquire the funds with
which to make payments out of principal, trust W could sell assets
408Brawerman, supra note 401, at 369. If trust W is deemed an incomplete gift, it
will be included in the wife's gross estate without reduction for the value of the life
estate in trust H given as consideration for the election. Cf. Lela Barry Vardell, 35 T.C.
No. 8 (Oct. 17, 1960).40ait has been suggested that this plan may be subject to attack under the "step
transaction" doctrine and therefore that it is undesirable. See Rice, Family Tax Planning,
ch. 12, § 40, at 395 (1960). Cf. Boyce v. United States, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 714
(W.D. La. Feb. 15, 1961).
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sufficient in amount to enable it to make the payments. Since trust
H has accumulated its income and since the amount which is to be
paid out of the corpus of trust W is equal to the amount of income
accumulated by trust H, trust H will always have available funds
to invest, assuring a ready market for the assets of trust W. This
plan would eventually exhaust the corpus of trust W and when this
occurs the wife should be allowed a right of support out of trust
H."' The provision for the wife's support should not make the income
of trust H taxable to the wife during the years of accumulation if
the wife is not the trustee. 1 Both of the above plans reduce the
corpus of trust W first, thereby reducing the estate tax payable by
the wife's estate at her subsequent death.4"
The husband's estate apparently is taxed only with the income
from his interest in the community during administration and not
with the income from the wife's interest."' The wife's execution of
an inter vivos election contemporaneously with the execution of
the husband's will, whereby she agrees to accept the provisions of
the will in lieu of her community rights at law, may cause the income
from her community one half to be taxed to the husband's estate
during administration, but only if it passes some property to the
husband during his lifetime.
IV. ESTATE TAX CONSEQUENCES TO THE WIFE
WHO ELECTS
It is the possible estate tax saving at the time of the wife's sub-
sequent death that makes the widow's election will so 'attractive to
a community property estate plan. A properly drafted widow's
election will may permit the wife's community interest to pass at
her death with a reduced estate tax or with no estate tax, according
to the facts in each case. Such a will may also permit the husband's
community interest, which passes to the wife, to escape the second
estate tax at her subsequent death. These advantages are in addition
409Brown, The Widow's Election as a Tax-Saving Device, 96 Trusts & Estates 30
(1957).
41"Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 678.
" In the case of borrowed funds the debt may be repaid to the husband's trust upon
the wife's subsequent death, and then the husband's trust should further reduce the in-
come tax liability by dividing the corpus into multiple trusts for the children. But cf.
Boyce v. United States, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 714 (W.D. La. Feb. 15, 1961).
"
2 Sneed v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1955) (husband and wife both re-
ceived income); see Jackson, Community Property and Federal Taxes, 12 Sw. L.J. 1, 34
(1958); cf. G.C.M. 9086, X-1 Cum. Bull. 243 (1931); but see Barbour v. Commissioner,
89 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1937). Here the wife had the power to negate the effect of her
inter vivos election by withdrawing fifty per cent of the corpus. Therefore, the husband's
estate was taxed only on one half of the income.
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to the other methods of reducing the wife's gross estate, thereby
minimizing the estate tax at her subsequent death. Since no estate
tax cases have decided this point, resort must be had to the applicable
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code and gift tax cases."'
A. The Code Provisions
Section 2031 delimits the gross estate as including the value at the
decedent's death of all property as provided in the subsequent
sections. Section 2036 provides for the inclusion of the value of
property transferred if the decedent retains a life estate, except in
the case of a sale for "an adequate and full consideration in money
or money's worth." Similarly, section 2041 provides for the inclusion
of the value of any property in which the decedent possessed a power
of appointment exercisable in favor of himself or his estate. Section
2043 provides that when a transfer or power is made or created for
a consideration "but is not a bona fide sale for an adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth" and is described in sections
2036 and 2041, only the excess of the fair market value at the time
of the decedent's death over the value of the consideration received
therefor is included in the gross estate.
If the wife elects under the will, apparently she has made a
transfer with a retained life estate.41 Otherwise, the wife's property
would not be taxed at her death since she has relinquished all control
over it except for the life estate which expires at her death. Further-
more, such an interest is not taxed to the husband's estate by reason
of the wife's election under his will.41 In a recent case involving a
joint and mutual will, the wife's election to abide by its terms which
gave her a life estate in the entire community, remainder over, with
a power to sell or consume the corpus as she desired, caused the entire
community to be included in her gross estate. 16 Upon analysis, how-
ever, the language of the will seems to create a general power of
appointment in the wife's favor. Thus, unless the statute is "tracked"
413 In Lela Barry Vardell, 35 T.C. No. 8 (Oct. 17, 1960), the court did not reach
this question as it decided the case on other grounds. See text at note 422 infra.
414 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, S 2036. But see Petitioner's Brief in Reply, p. 7, Lela Barry
Vardell (Tax Court Docket No. 75855). The wife's executor argued that the election at
the husband's prior death resulted in an exchange of her fee interest in one half of the
community estate for a life estate in the whole community; hence, nothing was left in the
wife's estate, i.e., the transfer was for full "consideration in money or money's worth."
The court held, however, that the transfer was includable in the wife's gross estate as a
transfer with a retained life estate. Lela Barry Vardell, 35 T.C. No. 8 (Oct. 17, 1960).
" See discussion of the estate tax consequences to the husband's estate upon the wife's
election under the will in the text at note 328 supra, and income tax consequences during
administration of the estate in the text at note 412 supra.
416Phinney v. Kay, 275 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1960).
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with care, the entire community may be taxed in the wife's gross
estate upon her subsequent death.
B. Valuation For Purposes Of The Estate Tax
Valuation of the community interest which is includable in a
wife's gross estate on her death subsequent to an election to take
under her husband's will is a difficult question. Conceivably, the
property that the wife receives by electing under the will may be
deemed consideration, thereby reducing the value of the property
which is included in the gross estate in the same manner as in the
computation of gift taxes. A "sale transaction" must occur before
the life estate in the husband's community interest is treated as con-
sideration.41 In Ferguson v. Dickson,4"' the husband's transfer of
property to a trust in which the wife had a contingent life estate,
pursuant to an ante-nuptial contract whereby the wife released her
dower interest, constituted a sale.4 ' It appears that this resembles
an exchange more than a sale. Apparently, the court's interpretation
of "sale" includes what is normally thought of as an exchange.42'
In the Chase and Siegel cases, as previously discussed, the life
estate was held to be consideration for gift tax purposes, reducing
the value of the taxable gift. Does it follow that these cases support
the proposition that a life estate in the husband's community interest
constitutes consideration for the wife's election under a widow's
election will for purposes of the estate tax? Before the enactment of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, the Supreme Court held that the
gift and estate tax provisions are to be construed harmoniously, and
where obvious reasons do not compel divergent treatment, identical
language is to be given identical meaning."' Section 2512 of the gift
tax statute and section 2043 of the estate tax statute utilize the same
concept of consideration, viz., "bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth." Under the reasoning
of the Chase and Siegel cases, the courts could hold that the life
estate in the husband's community interest is consideration for estate
417 For substantive law purposes the wife is treated as purchasing a life estate for value
when she renounces her vested interest in the community and elects under the will. Cf.
Borden v. Jenks, 140 Mass. 562, 5 N.E. 623 (1886); Muse v. Muse, 186 Va. 914, 45
S.E.2d 158 (1947).
418 300 Fed. 961 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 628 (1924). The action arose under
the Revenue Act of 1918, which required a "bona fide sale for a fair consideration in
money or money's worth."
"' Such a sale was also found to be made for a "fair" consideration although the
court indicated that it was not an adequate and full consideration.
42 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2043(b), now precludes dower from being consideration
to any extent.
4"'Merrill v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308, 313 (1945); see Lowndes and Kramer, op. cit. supra
note 374, at 308-10.
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tax purposes when a widow's election will is used. In Lela Barry
Vardell,422 it was contended that the wife made a sale or exchange
of her entire community interest for a life estate in the community
as a whole by her election under the husband's willy"a Since this
exchange was alleged to be for "adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth," it was contended that no part of her
community interest was includable in her gross estate. The court held
that under this particular will the wife made an incomplete gift. 3
As a result, the value of her entire community interest was included
in her gross estate without a reduction for the consideration she
received by electing under the will. Nevertheless, the court made
the following statement in dictum: "Were it not for the language
in Vardell's will ... it might well be that none of the property in
question should be included in the decedent's gross estate.""42 It is
not certain whether this dictum indicates that the court would adopt
the taxpayer's contention, viz., that the wife exchanged her entire
community interest for the life estate in the community as a whole 4aa
On the other hand, because of the property valuations in this case,
no other combination of values would result in total exclusion
from the wife's estate. To find that the wife's election under a widow's
election will results in an exchange of her community interest for
a life estate in the entire community seems to contradict the spirit
and purpose of the Chase and Siegel cases. If this result were sustain-
ed, the life estate that the wife retains in her community interest,
which requires her community interest to be included in her gross
estate, would also act as consideration which reduces the value of the
interest that is included in her gross estate. For this reason, the dictum
in the Vardell case should not be followed.
If the wife's election under the will results in a transfer with a
retained life estate or a transfer subject to a power of appointment,
section 2043 should reduce the amount included in her gross estate
by the value of the life estate in the husband's community interest
which acts as consideration for the election.42 It has been suggested




a The same contention was made for gift tax purposes in Zillah Mae Turman, 20 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 24,721 (M) (March 20, 1961), and the court rejected it.
423 The husband's will gave the wife a life estate in the entire community, remainder
to the children in trust. The wife had a power to invade the corpus for her own benefit.
Thus, it was said that she might deprive the remaindermen of the property.
42435 T.C. No. 8 (Oct. 17, 1960).424
a Apparently the court would not accept the taxpayer's contention in light of the fact
that it was rejected for gift tax purposes in Zillah Mae Turman, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem.
Dec. 24,721 (M) (March 20, 1961). Thus, the dictum cannot be given much weight.
42S Assume that at the husband's death there is a community estate of $1,000,000
after payment of his estate tax. The husband leaves the usual widow's election will and
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that the Commissioner might contend that a transfer cannot be for
"an adequate and full consideration" if its effect is to reduce the
taxable estate.4" More specifically, in the case of a widow's election
will the consideration received, viz., a life estate in the husband's com-
munity interest, is exhausted during the wife's lifetime. Therefore,
since nothing remains at her death, the life estate is said not to qualify
as consideration. This argument necessarily assumes that the wife
will exhaust the life estate she receives as consideration before her
death. One answer may be that the determination of the status of
the life estate as consideration for a widow's election should not be
based on her propensity to dissipate the life estate before her sub-
sequent death.
The date at which the consideration is to be valued for purposes
of the estate tax is not a problem for purposes of the gift tax." It
has been held that the value of a life estate for purposes of the estate
tax is to be determined at the time of the transfer and not upon the
wife's subsequent death when the value of the life estate can be
known for certain. "' This view eliminates many problems which
may arise by virtue of changed conditions which may exist upon
the wife's subsequent death, e.g., no assets with which to pay the
tax. On the other hand, however, some support may be found for
the proposition that when a life estate is the consideration received
by the wife, the actual value thereof at her death, rather than the
actuarial value at the time of the exchange, should be used in deter-
his wife elects to take thereunder after his death. Upon the wife's death, assuming that she
has been unable to exhaust her community interest and the values are the same as at the
husband's death, her estate tax consequences are as follows (for simplicity the gift tax is
not taken into account in this example)
Gross estate of the wife if she is: Age 60 Age 50
Retained life estate in wife's community interest $500,000 $500,000
Less: consideration (life estate in husband's community interest): 198,395 259,850
Total 301,606 240,150
Less exemption 60,000 60,000
Net estate 241,605 180,150
Tax 63,181 44,745
If there had been no election, the estate tax on the wife's community interest would have
been $126,500. Thus, a considerable saving is made. Of course, if the wife has exhausted
part of her estate by the time she dies, there will be a corresponding reduction of the tax.
426Brawerman, supra note 401, at 574; see also Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate
and Gift Taxes 313-17 (1956).
427 Westfall, supra note 387, at 1280. The question is posed whether some fractional
part of the property transferred is excluded from the estate or the dollar value of the
consideration is deducted from the estate.
42s Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 151 (1929); Lincoln Rochester Trust
Co. v. McGowan, 217 F.2d 287, 293 (2d Cir. 1954); Commissioner v. Bensel, 100 F.2d639 (3d Cir, 12)8).
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mining the amount to be included in her gross estate.42 If the latter
view prevails, it is obvious that the value of the consideration may
be different for purposes of the estate and gift taxes. In the Vardell
case, the wife lived twenty-one years after her election under the
will. Since the benefits she received were known, the taxpayer con-
tended that the actual value thereof (rather than the actuarial value
at the time of election) should be used in computing the considera-
tion. Alternatively, the taxpayer contended that the present value
of the benefits received, or the present value of the life estate in the
entire community, based on the wife's actual life of twenty-one
years after her election should be used. The taxpayer also contended
that the value of the wife's community interest at the date of her
election rather than at the date of her death should be used in
determining the amount that is to be included in her gross estate.
There seems to be no good reason to value the wife's community
interest at the date of the election rather than at the time of her
death. Indeed, a reading of section 2031 shows that the value at the
time of the decedent's death is the amount that is included. Finally,
it is believed that the same reasoning that causes the life estate in the
husband's community interest to be deemed consideration for gift
tax purposes should cause the same life estate to be consideration for
estate tax purposes.
C. Property Passing Outside Of Probate
Property that passes to the wife other than by the husband's will43
is taxed at the husband's death and subsequently at the wife's death
to the extent that it is not exhausted during her lifetime. The second
tax may be avoided by reducing the consideration she receives under
the will for her election to compensate for the property passing
outside of probate. In other words, the husband's will should provide
that the amount of property passing to the wife under the will
shall equal one half of the value of the entire community estate
which is subject to probate administration, less the value of one half
of the property passing to the wife outside of probate. To insure that
the wife has this property in mind when she elects, the will should
provide that her election to take thereunder is in consideration of
the property passing outside of the probate proceeding as well as
that passing under the will, and that unless she receives such property
the election is not binding upon her.43 Usually the husband can do
42. Nourse v. Riddell, 143 F. Supp. 759 (S.D. Cal. 1956). Here the life estate was
held adequate and full consideration and therefore no estate tax was due.
.. E.g., Probate homestead, insurance, family allowance, exempt property.
43 See text at note 394 supra.
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nothing to prevent the wife from receiving the property passing
outside of probate. Thus, if the wife receives such property regardless
of whether she elects under the will or against it, the argument for
treating such property as consideration for her election is very
weak.43
V. CONCLUSION
In common-law jurisdictions433 the estate plan normally is based
on the marital deduction allowed by section 2056. If the husband
transfers up to one half of his property to his wife, a deduction from
his gross estate of an amount not to exceed one half of his adjusted
gross estate is allowed. The purpose of the marital deduction is to
equalize the taxation in common-law and community property juris-
dictions, 35 and in the "classic situation" at common law, viz., when
the husband owns all of the property4" and predeceases the wife, the
marital deduction accomplishes its purpose.
In a community property jurisdiction the spouses own equal
portions of the community estate and are taxed the same irrespective
of which spouse dies first. If, however, the "classic situation" does
not exist at common law, e.g., the spouse who dies first has no
property or the smaller share of the property, an inequality exists
in the tax treatment for the survivor, as compared with a survivor
in a community property jurisdiction. The result is that little or no
432 Ibid.
411 Many of the conclusions and examples which follow can be found in Anderson,
The Marital Deduction and Equalization Under the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes Be-
tween Common Law and Community Property States, 54 Mich. L. Rev. 1087 (1956).
4 This section provides for a deduction from the gross estate of the decedent, of an
amount not to exceed 50 per cent of the "adjusted gross estate," for the value of any
property interest which passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, provided that
such interest qualifies as a deductible interest, i.e., generally, it must be includable in the
surviving spouse's gross estate.
... If the gross estate consists of community property, the marital deduction is not
available.
43 Assume a community estate valued at $1,000,000 and also a common-law situation
where the husband owns all of the property valued at $1,000,000. If the husband dies
first in both cases, the results are as follows:
Common Law Community Property
Husband's gross estate $1,000,000 $500,000
Less: marital deduction 500,000 -0-
Total 500,000 500,000
Less: specific exemption 60,000 60,000
Taxable estate 440,000 440,000
On the initial tax, the estate tax is equal, and on the wife's subsequent death, the $500,000
which escaped taxation in the common-law jurisdiction will be taxed in her estate. There-
fore, both the community property wife and the common-law wife have an estate of
$500,000 and are subject to the same tax.
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estate tax is paid upon the death of the first decedent, but the
survivor's estate is subjected to a large estate tax at his or her
subsequent death. If the property were owned equally by each
spouse, as in community property jurisdictions, the tax would be
divided on their separate deaths. Although the marital deduction
reduces the decedent's estate by the amount transferred to the
survivor, the latter's estate is correspondingly increased by the
amount of the transfer unless it is exhausted during his or her
lifetime. Since the estate tax is graduated upward, the second estate,
now larger, is taxed at a still higher rate.43 ' Therefore, if the first
decedent in a common-law jurisdiction does not own most of the
property, the resulting tax treatment cannot equal that of com-
munity property residents. If each spouse's property is approximately
equal in value, the tax result is similar to that which exists when the
survivor owns some property, but less than that once owned by the
first decedent. In either situation, use of the marital deduction may
not be advantageous if one estate is made larger than the other.3
Historically, a typical common-law estate plan provided that the
husband would leave a life estate to the wife with a remainder to
the children. This would not increase the wife's gross estate. When
.. Suppose that H and W are residents of a community property jurisdiction and
own a community estate valued at $1,000,000. In a common-law jurisdiction H-I owns
$750,000 and W-1 owns $250,000. If the wife dies first, the tax results are as follows:
Marital No Marital Community
Deduction Deduction Property
W's (W-1's) estate $250,000 $250,000 $500,000
Less: marital deduction 125,000 -0- -0-
Total 125,000 250,000 500,000
Less: specific exemption 60,000 60,000 60,000
Taxable estate 65,000 190,000 440,000
Tax 10,900 47,700 126,500
On H's subsequent death, the transfer from W must be added to his estate with the
following result:
H's (H-l's) estate 750,000 750,000 500,000
Add: W's (W-1's) transfer 125,000 -0- -0-
Total 875,000 750,000 500,000
Less: specific exemption 60,000 60,000 60,000
Taxable estate 815,000 690,000 440,000
Tax 257,250 212,200 126,500
Total tax on both estates 268,150 259,900 253,000
411 If the marital deduction were used in these situations, the first estate tax would
be considerably less than that imposed on the estate of the first decedent in a community
property jurisdiction, but the second tax would be much greater, provided the property
was not exhausted during the survivor's lifetime. Generally, the total tax is usually
greater than the total tax in the community property jurisdictions. Another alternative
is to have one or both spouses make inter vivos gifts. Of course, this may not be desirable




the marital deduction was enacted, the "terminable interest rule" 3'
prohibited a "life estate to the wife, remainder to the children"
limitation from qualifying for the marital deduction. Otherwise, the
life estate to the wife would be excluded from her gross estate because
it terminated at her death; and if it also qualified for the marital
deduction (exclusion from the husband's gross estate), it would
pass to the beneficiaries without the payment of any estate tax. This
type of transfer was excluded from the marital deduction by the
"terminable interest rule" for another reason, viz., it was thought
that a community property decedent could not control the disposi-
tion of the survivor's community interest by the terms of his will." '
Apparently, quantitative equality was sought in the types of testa-
mentary dispositions available to residents of each jurisdiction. Now,
common-law residents achieve favorable tax results by the husband's
devise of a life estate in all property to his wife with a general power
of appointment over one half of the remainder and a devising of the
other one half of the remainder to their children. The one half over
which the wife has a general power of appointment is included in
her gross estate but qualifies for the marital deduction from the
husband's estate.
By using a widow's election will, community property residents
may achieve the same substantive results achieved by the historical
common-law estate plan of "life estate to the wife, remainder to the
children." The tax results of the widow's election will are similar
to those achieved under the historical estate plan of common-law
decedents, which utilizes the marital deduction by employing a
general power of appointment, but with the added benefit of having
the life estate in the first decedent's one half deemed consideration
for the second decedent's transfer of the remainder, reducing the
amount subject to the tax.4°a In the widow's election will the husband
controls the entire community and yet the estate tax is computed
only on one half of the community estate. Two factors distinguish
this from the common-law situation. First, the wife must consent
to the disposition. Second, the wife incurs a gift tax upon her election
under the will and the property that she is deemed to have relinquish-
ed is included in her estate for purposes of the estate tax because of
the retained life estate. In community property jurisdictions, the
435 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2056(b) (1).
440S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1948-1 Cum. Bull. 285, at 305. In other
words, he cannot leave the survivor with nothing more than a life estate in the entire
community. Apparently the intended result was to achieve equality in a qualitative sense
in the mode of testamentary dispositions available to each property system.
140a Since the tax results of the widow's election are not settled law, some writers have
advised against its use. See Rice, op. cit. supra note 408a, at 391.
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substantive rules of community property prevent the property from
escaping taxation and the situation is analogous to common-law
jurisdictions where the "terminable interest rule" prevents the life
estate from qualifying for the marital deduction. As a result, the
advantage in favor of community property residents in the type of
disposition available is only qualitative in nature, i.e., a common-law
husband must choose between the marital deduction and entrusting
the property to the wife's power of disposition in the form of an
absolute transfer.
In a community property jurisdiction, if a wife elects to take
under a widow's election will, two tax advantages may accrue to her
benefit: (1) the husband's community property that passes to the
wife may escape a second estate tax upon her subsequent death, and
(2) the wife's community interest may be subjected to a smaller
estate tax. If the life estate in the husband's community interest is
deemed consideration for the wife's election to take under the will,
her gross estate obviously includes none of the following: (1) the
life estate in the husband's community interest, because it terminates
at her death, (2) that portion of her surrendered community interest
(remainder interest) which is equal in value to the life estate in the
husband's community interest, and (3) the portion of her com-
munity interest (life estate) which is exhausted before her death.
A distinct estate tax advantage to community property residents is
apparent.
The difference in treatment between common-law and community
property decedents has caused strong criticism of the widow's election
will as used in a community property jurisdiction. " ' Changes in the
Internal Revenue Code were suggested in anticipation of the affirm-
ance of the Chase case." ' The suggested changes would preclude a life
estate in the husband's community interest from being treated as con-
sideration of the wife's election. There is no doubt that this proposed
change was not contemplated by Congress when the term "considera-
tion" was first employed." 3 On the other hand, however, an amend-
441 See generally, Westfall, Estate Planning and the Widow's Election, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
1269 (1958).5 ALI Fed. Income, Estate & Gift Tax Stat. 40 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1956). Although
the Chase case was reversed on appeal, it was not reversed on this point.
443 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2043(b) first appeared in the Revenue Act of 1932.
S. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1932), accompanying the bill, read as follows:
This amendment excludes, in determining "consideration in money or
money's worth," the value of a relinquished, or a promised relinquishment
of, dower, curtesy, or other marital rights in a decedent's property. Sec.
302(a) and (b) of the 1926 act require the value of such an interest to be
included in the gross estate, and, if its value may, in whole or in part, con-
stitute a consideration for an otherwise taxable transfer (as has been held to
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ment of this nature may be more in adherence with the generally
accepted concept of consideration. One disadvantage of such an
amendment is that the wife would be precluded from ever making
an inter-family transfer in exchange for a life estate in the husband's
community interest even in situations where she is motivated solely
by "economic self-interest." Another solution would be to include all
of the community property in the husband's gross estate and allow
a marital deduction if the husband uses a widow's election will or
devises up to one half of the property to the wife. This possible
solution, however, is in conflict with the basic principles of com-
munity property.
be so), or an otherwise unallowable deduction from the gross estate, the
effect produced amounts to a subversion of the legislative intent expressed
in sec. 302(a) and (b).
For example, a decedent dies leaving his estate of $1,500,000 (after payment
of all charges), and under State law the surviving spouse is entitled to one-
third, or $500,000, of which she can not be deprived by will without her
consent. Under existing law the estate is entitled to no deduction on account
of her statutory rights, but, if she and decedent had entered into a contract
by which she was to receive from his estate a stated sum in consideration
of a waiver of her statutory rights, the amount due her under the contract
might be held a deductible claim against the estate as having been contracted
for an adequate and full consideration in money's worth, namely, the value
of her waived marital rights.
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